

ARTICLE XXVIII

Of the Lord's Supper.

The Supper of the Lord is not only a sign of the love that Christians ought to have among themselves one to another: but rather it is a Sacrament of our Redemption by Christ's death. Insomuch that to such as rightly, worthily, and with faith, receive the same, the Bread which we break is a partaking of the Body of Christ; and likewise the cup of blessing is a partaking of the Blood of Christ.

Transubstantiation (or the change of the substance of Bread and Wine) in the Supper of the Lord cannot be proved by Holy Writ; but is repugnant to the plain words of Scripture, overthroweth the nature of a Sacrament, and hath given occasion to many superstitions.

The Body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten, in the Supper, only after an heavenly and spiritual manner. And the mean whereby the Body of Christ is received and eaten in the Supper is Faith.

The Sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not by Christ's ordinance reserved, carried about, lifted up, or worshipped.

De Coena Domini.

Coena Domini non est tantum signum mutuae benevolentiae Christianorum inter sese, verum potius est Sacramentum nostrae per mortem Christi redemptionis.

Atque adeo, rite, digne, et cum fide sumentibus, panis quem frangimus est communicatio corporis Christi: similiter poculum benedictionis est communicatio sanguinis Christi.

Panis et vini transubstantiatio in Eucharistia ex sacris literis probari non potest. Sed apertis Scripturae verbis adversatur, Sacramenti naturam evertit, et multarum superstitionum dedit occasionem.

Corpus Christi datur, accipitur, et manducatur in Coena, tantum coelesti et spirituali ratione. Medium autem, quo corpus Christi accipitur et manducatur in Coena, fides est.

Sacramentum Eucharistiae ex institutione Christi non servabatur, circumferebatur, elevabatur, nec adorabatur.

Notes on the Text of Article XXVIII.

'Rightly, worthily, and with faith,' corresponds to the Latin *rite, digne, et cum fide*. *Rite* refers to all that is essential in the administration. *Digne* (used also in Article XXV) refers to the mode and spirit of reception, which is yet further qualified by the requirement *cum fide*.

The Latin word used here for 'partaking' is *communicatio*.

It may be observed that our Church uses the Latin word *Eucharistia*, but prefers in the English version the simple expression, 'the Lord's Supper.'

If we compare the present Article with the corresponding one (XXIX) of 1552, it will be noticed that there are a few verbal differences in the first part, and in the last clause, but that the intermediate portion, viz., 'The body of Christ is given ... is Faith,' has taken the place of the longer clause in the Article of 1552, which is here subjoined: – 'Forasmuch as the truth of man's nature requireth that the body of one and the self-same man cannot be at one time in many and divers places, but must needs be in some one certain place: therefore the body of Christ cannot

be present at one time in many and divers places. And because (as Holy Scripture doth teach) Christ was taken up into heaven, and there shall continue unto the end of the world, a faithful man ought not either to believe or openly to confess the real and bodily presence (as they term it) of Christ's flesh and blood in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper.'

The same influence which struck out of Elizabeth's Prayer Book the advertisement at the end of the Communion Service (restored in 1662) appears to have operated against the above clause, so similar to it, in the line of reasoning adopted against the ubiquity of the Lord's body.

Archdeacon Hardwick [*History of Arts.*, p. 395] suggests no sources for the text of this Article.

The Presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

The opinions which have prevailed on this subject may be arranged under three principal divisions, which will be considered in this order: –

- I. The corporal presence.
- II. The denial of any peculiar presence.
- III. The spiritual presence.

I. *The Corporal Presence.*

This will fall under two separate heads, *transubstantiation* and *consubstantiation*. The former of these, after a struggle prolonged for some centuries (for which the reader is referred to ecclesiastical history), may be considered as finally decreed by the Church of Rome, A.D. 1216, at the Lateran Council under Innocent III. This was confirmed by the following decree of the Council of Trent, [Sess. xiii. c. 4.] which also sufficiently defines the term transubstantiation: – 'That, by consecration of the bread and wine, a conversion is made of the whole substance of the bread into the substance of the body of Christ our Lord, and of the whole substance of the wine into the substance of His blood: which conversion is conveniently and properly called transubstantiation by the Holy Catholic Church.'

The Council proceeds to decree (c. 5) that this 'most holy sacrament shall be revered with the worship of latria which is due to the true God.'

Among the canons of the Council on this Sacrament are some to the following effect: –

1. That the body and blood of Christ, together with His soul and divinity, and therefore the whole Christ, are truly, really, and substantially *contained* in the Eucharist.
2. That the substance of the bread and wine do not remain together with the body and blood; but there is a conversion of the whole substance of the bread into the body, and of the whole substance of the wine into the blood. The 'species' of bread and wine only remaining.
3. That in each species, and under each individual part of each species when separated, the whole Christ is contained.
4. That this presence of the body and blood exists not only while being taken, but before and after; and also in the consecrated hosts or particles which remain after communion.

[*Note.* – Under the last clause the Roman casuists have raised those offensive questions about a mouse taking the reserved host, and similar suppositions, which have been erroneously attributed to Protestant irreverence!]

The second mode of holding the corporal presence of Christ in the elements is called *consubstantiation*. It is the belief of the Lutherans. Rejecting the notion of the change of the earthly elements of bread and wine, it holds that in some way the real body and blood of Christ are locally present with them. The original documents of the Lutheran Church do not explain this.

The confession of Augsburg (X) briefly says that ‘the body and blood of Christ are truly present, and are distributed to those eating in the Supper of the Lord.’

The Saxon Confession, A.D. 1551, asserts that ‘in this communion Christ is truly and substantially present, and the body and blood of Christ are truly exhibited to those receiving.’

The mode of this presence Luther himself usually shrank from defining. See the account of D’Aubigne’s *History of the Reformation* of the Marburg Conference between him and Zwingli, together with other divines of both parties.

But D’Aubigne [B. XI. c. xi.] gives this illustration from Luther’s writings: ‘Just as iron and fire, which are nevertheless two distinct substances, are confounded together in a heated mass of iron, so that in each of its parts there is at once iron and fire; in like manner, and with much greater reason, the glorified body of Christ is found in all the parts of the bread.’

Luther’s illustration fails before modern science, which tells us that cold and heat are only relative terms implying the presence of different degrees of heat.

This dogma involved another, when the possibility of such a bodily presence was discussed philosophically, viz., *ubiquitarianism*; or the doctrine that the glorified body of Christ is everywhere, *ubique*. This led to serious divisions in the Lutheran Church; some in their zeal for maintaining opinions scarcely distinguishable from Monophysitism.

The Ultra-Lutherans maintained this dogma with great acrimony, arguing it after the old scholastic method. ‘The Form of Concord’ A.D. 1576, a formula which caused much division in the Lutheran Church, [Hagenbach’s *History of Doctrines*, vol. ii. p. 329.] asserts ‘that Christ truly fills all things and rules everywhere, present not only as God, but also as man, from sea to sea and to the bounds of the earth.’

Further, that ‘the right hand of God is not any certain and circumscribed place in heaven, but is nothing else than the omnipotent virtue of God, which fills heaven and earth.’ Again, that ‘the divine and human nature in the person of Christ are united, so as not only to have names in common, but really and in fact communicate between themselves, without confusion and equality of essences – according to the doctrine of *communicatio idiomatum*.’

Luther’s own views may be seen from the following extract [*Ibid.* p. 299.]: ‘We are not so foolish as to believe that the body of Christ exists in the bread in the same visible manner in which bread is in the basket or wine in the goblet.... We believe that Christ’s body is present; otherwise we are quite willing that any one should say: Christ is *in* the bread, or is *the* very bread, or is *there* where the bread is, or as he likes. We will not quarrel about words, but merely insist upon keeping to the literal meaning, viz., that it is not simply bread of which we partake in the Lord’s Supper, but the body of Christ.’ Luther himself, in his controversy with the Swiss party, maintained the ubiquity of Christ’s body.

On this controversy our Church has made a positive declaration in the note appended to the Communion Service.

II. *The Denial of any Peculiar Presence*

The name of Zwingli has been identified with that view of the Lord’s Supper which makes it merely a commemorative sign and not a special or effectual means of grace. This view is negated by the first clause of Article XXV. Passages from the writings of Zwingli have been quoted to show that he did express himself to that effect. At the same time, that he knew a higher significance of the Sacrament appears from his confession of faith [Hagenbach, p. 297.]: ‘I believe that in the Holy Eucharist the true body of Christ is present to faith by contemplation.’

The Zwinglian doctrine on the Lord's Supper may probably be held and taught by many individuals in churches and sects, but it is not the avowed doctrine in the confession of any organized body of Christians who are orthodox on the Holy Trinity. Its consideration need not, therefore, delay us.

III. *The Spiritual Presence.*

Very early in the Reformation on the Continent arose, chiefly in Rhenish Germany, a party who stood midway between Luther and Zwingli, and attempted to moderate between them.

Bucer, who had so much influence in England in the reign of Edward VI, Oswald Myconius, and other eminent men, enunciated the doctrine of the Spiritual Presence of Christ to believers in the Lord's Supper, as opposed to his corporal presence in or with the elements, and to the notion of the Sacrament being a mere commemorative sign. [See Hagenbach, § 258, note 10.]

This doctrine speedily prevailed against the crude and imperfect views of Zwingli through all those sections of Reformed Christendom which were not avowedly Lutheran. Thenceforward German writers acknowledged two main divisions in Protestant Christianity, *the Lutheran* and *the Reformed*. A reference to so familiar a work as Mosheim's *History of the Church* will illustrate this. From the sixteenth century he groups together under the latter name the Swiss, Belgic, French, English, and Scotch Churches, the dividing line being manifestly their adherence to the spiritual as against the corporal presence.

The reception of this doctrine in the English Church was due in the first place to Ridley, who satisfied himself by independent historical and scriptural enquiry as to its antiquity and truth. [Soames' *Hist. of English Reform*, vol. iii. c. 2.] By his influence Cranmer was led to study and ultimately to adopt the same opinion. The learned foreigners, Bucer, Peter Martyr, &c., introduced by Cranmer, belonged to the *Reformed* rather than to the *Lutheran* section of the Church.

The Spiritual Presence thus became the doctrine of the English Liturgy and Articles.

In other countries the enormous influence which Calvin's systematic treatises exercised tended in the same direction.

The following lucid and moderate passage may illustrate his views [*Institutes*, iv. xvii. 19.]: 'The presence of Christ in the Supper we must hold to be such as neither affixes Him to the element of bread, nor encloses Him in bread, nor circumscribes Him in any way (this would obviously detract from His eternal glory); and it must, moreover, be such as neither divests Him of His just dimensions, nor dissevers Him by distance of place, nor assigns to Him a body of boundless dimensions, diffused through heaven and earth. All these things are clearly repugnant to His true human nature. Let us never allow ourselves to lose sight of the two restrictions—

'First, let there be nothing derogatory to the heavenly glory of Christ. This happens whenever He is brought under the corruptible elements of this world or is affixed to any earthly creatures. Secondly, let no property be assigned to His body inconsistent with His human nature. This is done when it is either said to be infinite, or made to occupy a variety of places at the same time.

'But when these absurdities are discarded, I willingly admit anything which helps to express the true and substantial communication of the body and blood of our Lord as exhibited to believers under the sacred symbols of the Supper, understanding that they are received not by the imagination or intellect merely, but are enjoyed in reality as the food of eternal life.'

With these views the confessions of the principal '*Reformed*' Churches – the Swiss, Dutch, Scotch Presbyterian, and the Church of England – will be found to be in substantial accordance.

For example, the Confession of Faith of the Established Church of Scotland [Chap. xxix. 7.] thus sets forth the doctrine of the presence:—

‘Worthy receivers, outwardly partaking of the visible elements in this sacrament, do then also inwardly by faith, really and indeed, yet not carnally and corporally, but spiritually, receive and feed upon Christ crucified and all benefits of his death: the body and blood of Christ being then not corporally and carnally in, with, or under the bread and wine; yet as really, but spiritually, present to the faith of believers in that ordinance as the elements themselves are to their outward senses.’

It is well that the student in theology should thus learn how utterly inaccurate are statements continually put forth for popular circulation, attributing Zwinglianism to Calvin and the Calvinistic Churches.

In illustration of the doctrine of the Church of England on the nature of the presence in the Lord’s Supper, we shall again allege the words of Hooker: —

‘Christ is termed our life because through Him we obtain life; so the parts of this sacrament are his body and blood, for that they are so to us who, receiving them, receive that by them which they are termed. The bread and cup are his body and blood because they are causes instrumental upon the receipt whereof the participation of his body and blood ensueth. For that which produceth any certain effect is not vainly nor improperly said to be that very effect whereunto it tendeth. Every cause is in the effect which groweth from it.’ [Ecc. Pol. v. 67.]

‘The real presence of Christ’s most blessed body and blood is not to be sought in the sacrament, but in the worthy receiver of the sacrament. ... I see not which way it should be gathered by the words of Christ when and where the bread is his body or the cup his blood; but only in the very heart and soul of him who receiveth them. As for the sacraments, they really exhibit, but for aught we can gather out of that which is written of them, they are not really, nor do really contain in themselves, that grace which, with them or by them, it pleaseth God to bestow.’ [Ecc. Pol. v. 67.]

The answer in the Church Catechism, ‘The Body and Blood of Christ which are verily and indeed taken and received by the faithful in the Lord’s Supper,’ must be interpreted in conformity with these views of the presence. ‘*The faithful*’ must mean those who have faith (not all persons baptized and calling themselves Christians). For ‘the mean whereby Christ is received is faith.’ Therefore without faith He is not received. ‘*The Body and Blood are verily and indeed taken,*’ but ‘*only after a heavenly and spiritual manner.*’ ‘*The natural Body and Blood of our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here.*’ Nor is there ‘*any corporal presence of Christ’s natural Flesh and Blood.*’ [Note appended to the Communion Service.]

The phrase ‘*Real Presence*’ has been, and is, used by many of our divines to express the genuine doctrine in opposition to Zwinglianism. It should, however, be observed that our Church has avoided it in her Liturgy and Articles; and it may be a needful caution to all who will exercise the office of public teachers, that they should be most wary (to say the least) about permitting this expression in their *popular teaching*. It is generally and popularly identified with the *corporal presence*. In spite of explanations to the contrary, the majority of hearers usually attribute to a word or phrase what *they* are accustomed to understand by it. It is the part of wisdom, therefore, to *avoid* as far as possible ambiguous expressions which tend to nurture distrust or misunderstanding.

This caution is added with the more confidence because it is adopted by Waterland. [Doctrines of the Eucharist, chap. vii.]

It is beyond the scope of this work to multiply quotations and authorities. But the work just referred to deserves special notice on this ground. In the first half of the last century some of the non-jurors propounded doctrines on the Lord's Supper akin to Romanising views lately advocated so prominently in our own days. Dr. Waterland, then Archdeacon of Middlesex, met these opinions in his *Review of the Doctrine of the Eucharist*, and in four Charges to the clergy of Middlesex. These have been recently republished by the present Bishop of London, 'at the request of the Archbishops of Canterbury and York'. Under these circumstances this work deserves special attention. In reference to the present Article, the seventh chapter will be found to deal most perspicuously with the mode of Christ's presence in the Lord's Supper. It is illustrated from analogy, from the Old Testament, from the Fathers, and from recognised divines of the Foreign Reformed Churches, and of the English Church. The following passage, cited with approval from Dr. Aldrich, will serve to illustrate Waterland's doctrine: –

'It is evident that since the body broken and blood shed neither do nor can now really exist, they neither can be really present, nor literally eaten or drunk; nor can we really receive them, but only the benefits purchased by them. But the body which now exists, whereof we partake, and to which we are united, is the glorified body; which is, therefore, verily and indeed received ... and by consequence said to be really present, notwithstanding its local absence; because a real participation and union must needs imply a real presence, though they do not necessarily imply a local one. For it is easy to conceive how a thing that is locally absent may yet be really received ... as when we commonly say a man receives an estate or inheritance, when he receives the deeds or conveyances of it.... The reception is confessedly real, though the thing itself is not locally or circumscriptively present, or literally grasped in the arms of the receiver.... The Protestants all agree that we spiritually eat Christ's body and drink his blood; that we neither eat nor drink nor receive the dead body nor the blood shed, but only the benefits purchased by them; that those benefits are derived to us by virtue of our union and communion with the glorified body, and that our partaking of it and union with it is effected by the mysterious and ineffable operation of the Holy Spirit.'

The last clause of this Article, referring to certain well-known Mediaeval and Roman uses of the consecrated elements will, perhaps, need no illustration. These practices stand or fall together with the doctrines to which they essentially belong. One of these, however, stands partially on another footing. In early times portions of the elements were sometimes reserved in order to be sent to the absent, the sick, and the prisoners for Christ's sake. [See Bingham, *Antiq. B.* xv. c. viii. 1–5.] Messengers who conveyed the portion so reserved might be laymen. Our Church has wisely declined to revive a practice which has given occasion to manifold superstitions; she has ordered all that remains of the consecrated elements after communion to be 'reverently' eaten and drunk immediately after the blessing. [Rubric after Communion Service.] This was also one of the early usages. [See Bingham, as above.]

ARTICLE XXIX.

Of the wicked which do not eat the Body of Christ in the use of the Lord's Supper.

The wicked, and such as be void of a lively faith, although they do carnally and visibly press with their teeth (as Saint *Augustine* saith) the Sacrament of the body and Blood of Christ: yet in nowise are they partakers of Christ, but rather to their condemnation do eat and drink the sign or Sacrament of so great a thing.

De manducatione corporis Christi, et impios illud non manducare.

Impii, et fide viva destituti, licet carnaliter et visibiliter (ut Augustinus loquitur) corporis et sanguinis Christi Sacramentum dentibus premant, nullo tamen modo Christi participes efficiuntur. Sed potius tantae rei Sacramentum, seu symbolum, ad iudicium sibi manducant et bibunt.

Notes on the Text of Article XXIX.

The Latin text appears to require no special comparison with the English.

This article was introduced by Archbishop Parker in 1563, but was not finally adopted until 1571. [Hardwick, p. 396.]

The following is the passage of Augustine to which reference is made. [Super Joann. Tract. 26.] Qui non manet in Christo, et in quo non manet Christus, procul dubio ned manducat *spiritualiter* carnem ejus, nec bibit ejus sanguinem, *licet carnaliter et visibiliter premat dentibus sacramentum corporis et sanguinis Christi*: sed magis tantae rei sacramentum ad iudicium sibi manducat et bibit.

The Article obviously has been closely founded on this passage. The portions in italics (the very part most relied upon in our Article) are rejected by the Benedictine editors as spurious, and there has been considerable controversy on the point. It was controverted in the days of Archbishop Parker himself. [Strype's Parker, B. iv. c. 6.] But the Archbishop maintained his point, and alleged other passages in proof. It is the very opposite to probability that such words should be added as a gloss in the Middle Ages; while it is probable that a zealous transcriber might omit them. Moreover they are certainly as old as the days of Bede and Alcuin. This question, however, does not affect the authority of the Article. Whether the words be the genuine expression of Augustine or not, our Church has adopted them and propounded them as containing the true doctrine.

Observations on Article XXIX.

This Article is a simple corollary to the last. If *faith* is the *mean* whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten, those who have not faith cannot receive and eat it. But, further, this Article categorically denies the possibility of the reception *in any wise*. Those without lively faith are 'in no wise' (*nullo modo*) partakers of Christ. This seems intended to exclude every possible subterfuge which might bring them in as partakers in a subordinate sense.

This Article is therefore a great difficulty with those who maintain a real objective presence in or with the consecrated elements. If the body of Christ is in anywise brought into union with the matter of the elements themselves by the act of consecration, then in some sense *all* who

partake of them must be partakers of Christ. So not only the Catechism of the Council of Trent, [II. iv. 48.] but most of those who maintain a corporal presence, assert. The difficulties inherent in such an assertion, especially in connection with St. John 6:54 ('Whoso eateth my flesh and drinketh my blood hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day') are felt to be so great that many able Romanist divines [E.g. Cajetan.] do not interpret the expressions in that chapter to mean feeding on Christ in the Eucharist. But the direct application of the chapter to the Lord's Supper is the usual Roman interpretation. [E.g. Catechism of Trent, II. iv. 52.]

On this subject the sixth chapter of Waterland on the Eucharist will be found very clear and satisfactory. It contains a brief review of the ancient and modern interpretations of the sixth chapter of St. John. It may be well to add some of the conclusions.

'There have been two extremes in the accounts given of the Fathers, and both of them owing, as I conceive, to a want of proper distinctions. They who judge that the Fathers, in general, or almost universally, do interpret John vi. of the Eucharist, appear not to distinguish between interpreting and applying. It was right to apply the general doctrine of John vi. to the particular case of the Eucharist considered as worthily received, because the spiritual feeding there mentioned is the thing signified in the Eucharist, yea and performed likewise. After we have sufficiently proved from other Scriptures that in and by the Eucharist, ordinarily, such spiritual food is conveyed, it is then right to apply all that our Lord, by St. John, says in the general, to that particular case; and this indeed the Fathers commonly did. But such application does not amount to interpreting that chapter of the Eucharist.'

Waterland then proceeds to discuss the language of Ignatius, Irenaeus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian, &c. &c., and sums up his comments thus: 'From this summary view of the ancients it may be observed that they varied sometimes in their constructions of John vi. or of some parts of it; but what prevailed most, and was the general sentiment wherein they united, was that Christ himself is properly and primarily our bread of life, considered as the Word made flesh, as God incarnate, and dying for us; and that whatever else might, in a secondary sense, be called heavenly bread (whether sacraments or doctrines, or any holy service), it was considered but as an antepast to the other, or as the same thing in the main under a different form of expression.'

The distinction thus drawn between '*interpreting*' and '*applying*' a passage is most valuable. It will be the key by which the reader may open the perplexity of some strange apparent contradictions in quotations from the Fathers on other subjects beside this.

ARTICLE XXX.

Of both Kinds

The Cup of the Lord is not to be denied to the lay people. For both the parts of the Lord's Sacrament, by Christ's ordinance and commandment, ought to be ministered to all Christian men alike.

De utraque specie.

Calix Domini laicis non est denegandus, utraque enim pars Dominici Sacramenti, ex Christi institutione et praecepto, omnibus Christianis ex aequo administrari debet.

Notes on the Text of Article XXX.

The Latin and English versions of this Article are equally perspicuous, and require no special comment. The Article was added in Elizabeth's time; it appears to have been written by Archbishop Parker.

Observations on Article XXX.

Romish advocates after the Reformation used to attempt to show that the administration in both kinds was not *universal* in primitive times. But the more candid amongst them are compelled to own that in public administration it was so. Cardinal Bona, quoted by Bingham, [XV. v. 1.] says that 'the faithful always, and in all places, from the very first foundation of the Church to the 12th century, were used to communicate under the species of bread and wine. And in the beginning of that century the use of the cup began by little and little to be laid aside, whilst many of the bishops interdicted the people the use of the cup for fear of irreverence and effusion. And what they did at first for their own churches was afterwards confirmed by canonical sanction in the Council of Constance.' This may be admitted as a sufficient historical account of the matter from the pen of an adversary. It is not much to the purpose whether or not in ancient times *private* communion was sometimes given in one kind only, as Bona maintains. Supposing such cases made out, still it remains that the public communion of the Church was uniformly, as Bona admits, under both kinds. It will be observed that the denial of the cup arose about the same time as the legal establishment of the doctrine of transubstantiation, to which indeed it is a corollary. Wickliffe, Huss, and other early reformers, brought this abuse prominently forward.

The Bohemians, who rose against the decrees of the Council of Constance, demanded the cup, and were hence called Calixtines. [Mosheim, c. xv. p. ii. 5.]

The denial of the cup is defended by the Council of Trent [Sess. xxi.] thus:

Cap. I. That Christ instituted the Supper under both kinds, but did not make both binding on all the faithful. Also that in St. John 6 Christ varied the expression, sometimes saying *eating and drinking*, sometimes *eating* only.

Cap. II. That this is a matter which the Church has power to regulate according to the text, 'Let a man so account of us as stewards of the mysteries of God.'

Cap. III. That under either species the whole and entire Christ is received, and that, therefore, the communicant under one kind only is not defrauded.

The reasons for the denial of the cup are thus stated [Catechism of Trent, II. iv. 63.]: —

1. To avoid spilling the blood.
2. Because wine reserved might turn acid.
3. Because some cannot bear the smell or taste of wine.

4. Because in some countries wine is very scarce.
5. In order more plainly to oppose the heresy of those who deny that the *whole* Christ is contained under *either* species.

It is unnecessary to add anything in refutation of this un-Scriptural and confessedly non-primitive practice.

ARTICLE XXXI.

*Of the one Oblation of Christ finished
upon the Cross.*

The offering of Christ once made is the perfect redemption, propitiation, and satisfaction, for all the sins of the whole world, both original and actual, and there is none other satisfaction for sin but that alone. Wherefore the sacrifices of Masses, in the which it was commonly said that the Priests did offer Christ for the quick and the dead to have remission of pain or guilt, were blasphemous fables and dangerous deceits.

*De unica Christi oblatione in cruce
perfecta.*

Oblatio Christi semel facta, perfecta est redemptio, propitiatio, et satisfactio pro omnibus peccatis totius mundi, tam originalibus quam actualibus. Neque praeter illam unicam est ulla alia pro peccatis expiatio. Unde missarum sacrificia, quibus vulgo dicebatur, sacerdotem offerre Christum in remissionem poenae, aut culpae, pro vivis et defunctis, blasphema figmenta sunt, et perniciosae imposturae.

Notes on the Text of Article XXXI.

In this important doctrinal Article, the verbal criticism must not be overlooked. The following Latin equivalents may be noticed. ‘Once made’ – Latin, *semel facta*, *semel* = ἅπαξ, ‘once only, and not again.’ ‘One oblation’ – Latin, *unica*, not *una*: ‘one only of its kind,’ *unique*. ‘Pain or guilt’ – Latin, *poenae aut culpae*. ‘Fables’ – Latin, *figmenta*. ‘Dangerous deceits’ – Latin, *perniciosae imposturae*.

This Article is one of the original series of 1552, and only received verbal change in Elizabeth’s time. One such change is noticeable, namely, the substitution of the word *propitiation* in the English version for the original expression, ‘*the pacifying of God’s displeasure.*’

This Article is said by Hardwick to be based on the Augsburg Confession, Part II. 3, but the resemblance appears very slight, and only extends to some obvious expressions.

Observations on Article XXXI.

As first written, this Article was no doubt intended to meet the Roman doctrine of the *repetition* of the sacrifice of Christ in the Mass. In our day it has a further value. It will be found not only to meet the Romish error of excess, but also the modern rationalising errors of defect in the great doctrine of the Atonement.

It will be necessary first to state the Roman doctrine, which is as plainly opposed to the English as words can make it. We refer, as before, to the Council of Trent. [Sess. xxii.]

Cap. II. 'Since the same Christ who once offered himself by his blood on the altar of the cross is contained in this divine sacrifice which is celebrated in the Mass, and offered without blood, the holy Council teaches that this sacrifice is really propitiatory, and made by Christ himself... For assuredly God is appeased by this oblation, bestows grace and the gift of repentance, and forgives all crimes and sins, how great soever; for the sacrifice which is now offered by the ministry of the priests is one and the same as that which Christ then offered on the cross, only the mode of offering is different. And the fruits of that bloody oblation are plentifully enjoyed by means of this unbloody one; so untrue is it that the latter derogates from the glory of the former. Wherefore it is properly offered according to apostolic tradition not only for the sins, punishments, satisfactions, and other necessities of living believers, but also for the dead in Christ, who are not yet thoroughly purified.'

Canon 1. 'If any one shall affirm that a true and proper sacrifice is not offered to God in the Mass, or that nothing else is offered save that Christ is given to us to eat, let him be anathema.'

Canon 3. 'If any one shall affirm that the sacrifice of the Mass is only one of praise and thanksgiving, or a bare commemoration of the sacrifice accomplished on the cross, but not propitiatory; or that it only profits the receiver, and ought not to be offered for the living and the dead, for sins, punishments, satisfactions, and other necessities, let him be anathema.'

Canon 4. 'If any one shall affirm that the most holy sacrifice of Christ finished on the cross is blasphemed by the sacrifice of the Mass, or that the latter derogates from it, let him be anathema.'

The scriptural treatment of this subject is twofold. First, negative, from considerations of the silence of the Epistles upon this subject. The application of the sacrifice of the death of Christ for sin is the most vital point of Christianity; but not a word is breathed throughout the Epistles as to this mode of applying it to the sinner's needs. Second, positive, from the numerous passages which speak of the death of Christ, and the sinner's justification by faith in Him. But especially from a careful study of the Epistle to the Hebrews which deals at large with the priestly functions of Christ.

Turning to the Article itself, it will be observed that four words are accumulated to express the effect of Christ's death, '*Redemptio, propitiatio, satisfactio, expiatio.*' These words are also used in the Communion Service (see especially the consecration prayer). Each of them expresses a particular bearing of the death of Christ on the salvation of a sinner. *Redemption* regards the price paid. *Propitiation* imports the restored favour of God. *Expiation* implies atonement made and accepted. But of all these words *Satisfaction* is in some respects the most important, as bringing the element of entire sufficiency into all these modes of expression. It is a word with a perfectly defined theological meaning, which may be illustrated by the following passage from Hooker. [*Ecc. Pol.* vi. 5.] 'Satisfaction is a work which justice requireth to be done for contentment of persons injured; neither is it in the eye of justice a sufficient satisfaction, unless it fully equal the injury for which we satisfy. Seeing, then, that the sin against God eternal and infinite must needs be an infinite wrong, justice in regard thereof doth necessarily exact an infinite recompense, or else inflicts upon the offender infinite punishment. Now, because God was thus to be satisfied, and man not able to make satisfaction in such sort, his unspeakable love and inclination to save mankind from eternal death ordained in our behalf a Mediator to do that which had been for any other impossible. Wherefore all sin is remitted in the only faith of Christ's passion, and no man without belief thereof justified. Faith alone maketh Christ's satisfaction ours, howbeit that faith alone, which, after sin, maketh us by conversion His.'

It is through these four words, but especially through the word *satisfaction*, that this Article meets certain prevalent errors which obscure, if they do not deny, the propitiatory and satisfactory work of Christ in His sacrifice.

With regard to the historical treatment of the general subject of the Article it may be observed that in very early times the words ‘sacrifice’ and ‘altar’ were used in connection with the Lord’s Supper. When it is remembered that praise, almsgiving, self-devotion, &c., are called *sacrifices* in the New Testament, the student will not be unduly influenced by the above fact, but will enquire carefully further as to the sense in which such words were used. The words, however, having been once introduced, and having come into ordinary usage, suffered the usual fate of ambiguities. With the progress of doctrinal corruption the idea of expiatory sacrifice offered by the priest on an altar came in, and as with the doctrine of transubstantiation so with this; after centuries of oscillating and contradictory language, the doctrine of the propitiatory sacrifice of the Mass became firmly established. The student must therefore be prepared to meet with very contradictory statements confidently alleged from writers of the first ten centuries on this subject. For the further consideration of the subject of the Christian sacrifice, especially in its bearing on the Lord’s Supper, a careful study is recommended of a very valuable chapter (the twelfth) of Waterland on the Eucharist.

Amongst its statements we may select the following. From Augustine it is shown that a ‘true sacrifice is any work done with a view to our bond of holy union with God, having a reference to Him as our highest good.’ Thus works of mercy are ‘true sacrifices,’ according to Augustine, ‘if done with a view to God,’ otherwise they are no sacrifice at all. This throws light on the meaning of the ancient when they call the Eucharist a ‘true sacrifice.’ They looked upon the spiritual sacrifices as true and proper sacrifices; even more so than the legal offerings. And to make the Eucharist a material sacrifice would, in their estimation, have degraded it to the level of the legal ceremonies.

The ‘true and evangelical sacrifices’ are thus enumerated.

1. The sacrifice of alms to the poor and oblations to the Church, with a religious intent, and offered through Christ. Phil. 4:18. The offering goes to the poor, but *the service* is God’s.
2. The sacrifice of prayer, from a pure heart, is evangelical incense. Rev. 5:8.
3. The sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving to the Father, through the Son. Heb. 13:15.
4. The sacrifice of a penitent, and contrite heart. Ps. 51:17.
5. The sacrifices of ourselves, our souls, and our bodies. Rom. 12:1.
6. The offering up of the mystical body of Christ, that is the Church, which is the same as the last taken collectively.
7. The offering up of true converts by their pastors, who have laboured successfully in this blessed work. Rom. 15:16.

8. The sacrifice of faith and hope and self-humiliation in commemorating the grand sacrifice and resting finally upon it is another Gospel sacrifice, and eminently proper to the Eucharist.

‘These, I think are all so many true sacrifices, and may all meet together in the one great complicated sacrifice of the Eucharist. Into some one or more of thee may be resolved (as I conceive) all that the ancients have ever taught of Christian sacrifices, or of the Eucharist under the name or notion of a true or proper sacrifice.’

After this follows an examination of the language of Fathers of the first four centuries when treating of Christian sacrifices. Waterland’s conclusion is this: ‘The Fathers well understood that to make Christ’s natural body the real sacrifice of the Eucharist would not only be absurd in reason, but highly presumptuous and profane; and that to make the outward symbols a proper

sacrifice, a material sacrifice, would be entirely contrary to Christian principles, degrading the Christian sacrifice into a Jewish one, yea, and making it much lower and meaner than the Jewish, both in value and dignity. The right way, therefore, was to make the sacrifice spiritual; and it could be no other on Gospel principles.’

The student may at least take this argument as a warning of the utter insecurity of relying upon isolated quotations from the Fathers, apart from an acquaintance with their phraseology, their habits of thought, and their mode of reasoning.

ARTICLE XXXII.

Of the Marriage of Priests.

Bishops, Priests, and Deacons are not commanded by God’s Law either to vow the estate of single life or abstain from marriage. Therefore it is lawful also for them, as for all other Christian men, to marry at their own discretion, as they shall judge the same to serve better to godliness.

De conjugio Sacerdotum.

Episcopis, presbyteris, et diaconis nullo mandato divino praeceptum est, ut aut coelibatum voveant, aut a matrimonio abstineant. Licet igitur etiam illis, ut caeteris omnibus Christianis, ubi hoc ad pietatem magis facere judicaverint, pro suo arbitratu matrimonium contrahere.

Notes on the Text of Article XXXII.

The comparison of the Latin with the English text appears to throw no additional light on the subject of this Article. The corresponding Article of 1552 consisted of the first clause only of the present form, and that with some verbal variation. In the earlier form of the Article it was simply asserted that the marriage of the clergy was not forbidden. It is now added that they are under no different obligation from other Christian men in this respect, and that it is lawful for them to marry.

The wording of the Article does not appear to be traced to any special source. In the negotiations between Henry VIII and the Lutherans in 1538 for agreement on a confession of faith, it was on the point of clerical celibacy, together with transubstantiation and private masses, that they failed to agree. [Hardwick c. iv.]

Observations on Article XXXII.

The Scripture authority on this question is so clear that little remains beyond the history of the growth of the restriction on the marriage of the clergy.

From very early times there was an undue regard paid to celibacy as having in itself some peculiar virtue instead of being a state of life profitable for the usefulness of some, according to the decision of St. Paul on this subject. [1 Cor. 7:7.] ‘Every man hath his proper gift of God, one after this manner and another after that.’

The origin of these opinions may with high probability be traced up to those notions of evil connected with matter which had for centuries been a part of Eastern philosophy, and which led to ascetic practices long before the commencement of Christianity. Gnostic and Manichean

doctrines were vanquished by the Church, but as often happens the conquerors became tinged with some of the views of the conquered.

At the Council of Nice a decree to enforce celibacy on the clergy was proposed, but it was rejected. But shortly before this, A.D. 305, the Council of Illiberis, a provincial council in Spain, had prohibited the clergy from marriage. [Neander, iii. p. 197.] After this there was a struggle for centuries. The popular feeling undoubtedly attributed superior efficacy and sanctity to an unmarried priest. Gregory VII, A.D. 1074, is commonly spoken of as first effectually imposing celibacy on the clergy. In England Archbishop Anselm, A.D. 1108, finally enforced the same.

The doctrine of the Romish Church is stated thus by the Council of Trent [Sess. xxiv.]:

Canon 6. Marriage is disannulled if one of the parties enters into a religious order.

Canon 9 anathematizes all who affirm that a person in holy orders, or regulars, who have made a solemn profession of chastity, may contract marriage.

The Greek Church requires marriage as a qualification for the priesthood, but does not permit a priest who is a widower to remarry – so interpreting 1 Tim. 3:2, 12.

The question of the celibacy of the clergy has been, and is, much discussed in the Roman Church. It seems to be maintained from a feeling of its importance to the *Papal* system. It isolates the clergy from the ordinary interests and associations of their fellow-countrymen, and fits them better to be the willing ministers of a foreign power. It is probable also that the laity may upon the whole prefer an unmarried clergy to receive the secrets of the confessional.

ARTICLE XXXIII.

*Of excommunicate Persons, how they
are to be avoided.*

That person which by open denunciation of the Church is rightly cut off from the unity of the Church and excommunicated ought to be taken of the whole multitude of the faithful as an Heathen and Publican until he be openly reconciled by penance and received into the Church by a Judge that hath authority thereunto.

De excommunicatis vitantlis.

Qui per publicam Ecclesie denunciationem rite ab unitate Ecclesie praecisus est, et excommunicatus, is ab universa fidelium multitudine (donec per poenitentiam publice reconciliatus fuerit arbitrio judicis competentis) habendus est tanquam ethnicus et publicanus.

Notes on the Text of Article XXXIII.

The Latin equivalent for ‘rightly cut off,’ is ‘*rite praecisus*,’ for it does not suffice that the excommunication be *right* in point of the offender’s deserts, but it must be *in due order* as respects the *manner* of the action of the Church. And one of the essentials in this is defined by the Article to be *publicity*, ‘*open denunciation*,’ or ‘*publicam denunciationem*.’ Penance – Latin, *poenitentiam*. Heathen – Latin, *ethnicus*, or Gentile: ‘a stranger to the commonwealth of Israel.’

This was one of King Edward’s Articles, and no special source is indicated for its style and language.

Observations on Article XXXIII.

It is manifestly a power inherent in any community, civil or religious, to exclude from their body, or to deprive wholly or partially of privileges, offenders against the rules or interests of the community.

The Jewish rabbis of old accordingly exercised this power in several degrees. [See any Biblical Dictionary under the word *Anathema*.] And from the beginning the Christian Church inflicted excommunication of various degrees on offenders. This was recognised by our Lord, [Matt. 18:15–18.] in many passages of the Epistles. [As 1 Cor. 5:3–5, &c.]

When, after the conversion of Constantine, the authority of the bishops was recognised by the State, a sentence of excommunication became a serious matter in a civil point of view. In course of time it drew with it civil disabilities, while the relaxation of discipline which pervaded the administration of the Church blunted its effect as a check upon immorality.

Further, when the power of the Popes assumed strength, their excommunication became a formidable weapon in dealing even with princes. But it lost its efficacy by excessive abuse; and the excommunications of Luther, of Henry VIII, and of Elizabeth were effectual only in the recoil of the weapon.

The Roman law of excommunication may be seen in any treatise on the Canon Law, and will be found to legalise and require the religious tyranny and persecution of the Middle Ages. The Council of Trent speaks in guarded language on this point in its closing decree, but sufficiently indicates its demand for the exercise of the power of the State to persecute.

By the Canons of the Church of England (A.D. 1603) impugners of the king's supremacy, or of the doctrine and ceremonial of the Church, and all schismatics are declared to be excommunicate. The same sentence is pronounced upon various offenders against sundry regulations, and also upon those guilty of grave immorality.

By the common law of England the civil courts formerly enforced penalties on the excommunicated. The progress of legal reform since the Reformation gradually diminished this exercise of the civil power; and it has been entirely removed by modern legislation, excepting so far as it may be in vindication of the proper discipline and jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts over ecclesiastics.

Excommunication can only be pronounced by a lawful ecclesiastical judge sitting in open court and after a due hearing of the cause. The expression '*ipso facto excommunicated*' in several of the Canons implies no more than that *if* the person in question be ultimately sentenced, the excommunication will be retrospective and date back from the commission of the offence. But it does not empower anyone to deal with the supposed offender as an excommunicated person on his own private judgment. Nothing but a formal and legal sentence of excommunication can justify such a treatment. This is important as bearing on the Rubrics in the Burial and Communion Services.

In the present state of the law it is doubtful how far an ecclesiastical court can pronounce sentence on a lay person in any case whatever.

ARTICLE XXXIV.

This article has been commented upon in combination with Article XX. See above.

PART V.
REGULATIONS AFFECTING THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN
PARTICULAR.

- 35. Of the Homilies.
- 36. Of the English Ordinal.
- 37. Of Civil Magistrates.

ARTICLE XXXV.

Of Homilies.

The second Book of Homilies, the several titles whereof we have joined under this Article, doth contain a godly and wholesome Doctrine, and necessary for these times, as doth the former Book of Homilies which were set forth in the time of *Edward* the Sixth; and therefore we judge them to be read in Church by the ministers, diligently and distinctly, that they may be understood of the people.

Of the Names of the Homilies.

1. Of the right use of the Church.
2. Against peril of Idolatry.
3. Of repairing and keeping clean of Churches.
4. Of good Works; first, of Fasting.
5. Against Gluttony and Drunkenness.
6. Against Excess of Apparel.
7. Of Prayer.
8. Of the Place and Time of Prayer.
9. That common Prayers and Sacraments ought to be ministered in a known Tongue.
10. Of the reverent estimation of God's Word.
11. Of Alms-doing.
12. Of the Nativity of Christ.
13. Of the Passion of Christ.
14. Of the Resurrection of Christ.
15. Of the worthy receiving of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ.
16. Of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.
17. For the Rogation-days.
18. Of the state of Matrimony.
19. Of Repentance.
20. Against Idleness.
21. Against Rebellion.

De Homiliis.

Tomus secundus Homiliarum, quarum singulos titulos huic Articulo subjunximus, continet piam et salutarem doctrinam, et his temporibus necessariam, non minus quam prior Tomus Homiliarum, quae editae sunt tempore Edwardi sexti: Itaque eas in Ecclesiis per ministros diligenter, et clare, ut a populo intelligi possint, recitandas esse judicavimus.

De nominibus Homiliarum.

- Of the right use of the Church
Against peril of Idolatry
Of repairing and keeping clean of Churches.
Of good Works; first, of Fasting.
Against Gluttony and Drunkenness.
Against Excess of Apparel.
Of Prayer.
Of the Place and Time of Prayer.
That common Prayers and Sacraments ought to be ministered in a known Tongue.
Of the reverent estimation of God's Word.
Of Alms-doing.
Of the Nativity of Christ.
Of the Passion of Christ.
Of the Resurrection of Christ.
Of the worthy receiving of the Sacrament of the Body and Blood of Christ.
Of the Gifts of the Holy Ghost.
For the Rogation-days.
Of the state of Matrimony.
Of Repentance.
Against Idleness.
Against Rebellion.

Notes on the Text of Article XXXV.

This Article was substituted in Elizabeth's time for the previous one of Edward, which was very similar in its terms, but as a matter of course recognised the First Book of Homilies only.

The name is of Greek origin, ομιλία, so called as being rather a familiar and instructive discourse than an oration. So also the Latin word *sermo*, which nearly corresponds.

Observations on Article XXXV.

The only question can be as to the degree of assent hereby given to the Homilies. A quibbler might satisfy himself by finding in them the least modicum of doctrine with which he could agree, and say that they contained therefore 'a godly and wholesome doctrine.' But it would

have been childish to insert such an Article if it were not intended to affirm a general assent to the Homilies. They are popular discourses and were not meant to be subjected to that verbal criticism of nicety of arrangement and expression required in a formulary of faith. But if the Article has any use or force at all, it must imply a general approval of the doctrines, as distinguished from any particular arguments used by the writers, or special illustrations or ideas adapted to those times. It will be remembered that the eleventh Article gives a yet higher authority to the Homily on Justification.

The great necessity for such volumes as the two collections of Homilies will at once be manifest when it is remembered that on the restoration of the Reformation under Elizabeth only eighty parish priests declined to conform. The great mass of the clergy, therefore, both in Edward's reign and in the early part of Elizabeth's, were those who had conformed to every change of Henry VIII, of Edward, of Mary, and of Elizabeth, and were incompetent and unfit in every point of view to preach.

The authorship of the Homilies is obscure. Cranmer is credited with the greater part of the First Book, and Jewel with the Second. Some, however were certainly by other hands. Two were written by Taverner.

The two Books of Homilies are now usually published in one volume. It may be well to give here the list of the Homilies in the First Book.

1. A Fruitful Exhortation to the reading of Holy Scripture.
2. Of the misery of all mankind.
3. Of the salvation of all mankind.
4. Of the true and lively Faith.
5. Of good Works.
6. Of Christian Love and Charity.
7. Against Swearing and Perjury.
8. Of the declining from God.
9. An Exhortation against the Fear of Death.
10. An Exhortation to Obedience.
11. Against Whoredom and Adultery.
12. Against Strife and Contention.

ARTICLE XXXVI.

See Article XXIII above, in conjunction with which this Article has been treated.

ARTICLE XXXVII.

Of the Civil Magistrates.

The Queen's Majesty hath the chief power in this Realm of *England*, and other her dominions, unto whom the chief government of all estates of this Realm, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Civil, in all causes doth appertain, and is not, nor ought to be, subject to any foreign jurisdiction.

Where we attribute to the Queen's Majesty the chief government, by which titles we understand the minds of some slanderous folks to be offended; we give not to our princes the ministering either of God's Word, or of Sacraments, the which thing the Injunctions also lately set forth by *Elizabeth* our Queen doth most plainly testify: But that only prerogative, which we see to have been given always to all godly princes in holy Scriptures by God himself; that is, that they should rule all estates and degrees committed to their charge by God, whether they be Ecclesiastical or Temporal, and restrain with the civil sword the stubborn and evildoers.

The Bishop of *Rome* hath no jurisdiction in this Realm of *England*.

The laws of the Realm may punish Christian men with death, for heinous and grievous offences.

It is lawful for Christian men, at the commandment of the Magistrate, to wear weapons and serve in the wars.

De civilibus Magistratibus.

Regia Majestas in hoc Angliae regno, ac caeteris ejus dominiis, summam habet potestatem, ad quam omnium statuum hujus regni, sive illi ecclesiastici sint, sive civiles, in omnibus causis, suprema gubernatio pertinet, et nulli externae jurisdictioni est subjecta, nec esse debet.

Cum Regiae Majestati summam gubernationem tribuimus, quibus titulis intelligimus animos quorundam calumniatorum offendi, non damus Regibus nostris, aut verbi Dei, aut Sacramentorum administrationem, quod etiam Injunctiones ab Elizabetha Regina nostra, nuper editae, apertissime testantur: sed eam tantum praerogativam, quam in sacris Scripturis a Deo ipso, omnibus piis Principibus, videmus semper fuisse attributam: hoc est, ut omnes status atque ordines fidei suae a Deo commissos, sive illi ecclesiastici sint, sive civiles, in officio contineant, et contumaces ac delinquentes gladio civili coerceant.

Romanus pontifex nullam habet jurisdictionem in hoc regno Angliae.

Leges regni possunt Christianos propter capitalia, et gravia crimina, morte punire.

Christianis licet, ex mandato magistratus, arma portare, et justa bella administrare.

Notes on the Text of Article XXXVII.

The Latin text calls for no special comment.

The corresponding Article (the 36th) of Edward differs from the present chiefly in the portion dealing with the royal supremacy which was simply asserted as follows: 'The King of England is Supreme Head in earth next under Christ, of the Church of England and Ireland.'

The Royal Supremacy

For a full comment on this part of the Article we must refer to those portions of civil and ecclesiastical history which treat of the prolonged resistance of the English Crown to the papal claims; the repudiation of those claims by Henry VIII; the intermediate struggles; and the final establishment of the supremacy under Elizabeth; to which we must add the extent to which this prerogative was strained by the Tudor and Stuart princes and the steadfast opposition carried out through so many years by the Puritans.

In the original statute of 1534, which first declared the royal supremacy, the words used were these: The king 'shall be taken, accepted, and reputed the only and supreme head in earth of the Church of England.' The title *Head* was open to obvious objections as being applied in the New Testament to Christ. Papist and Puritan alike did not lose the opportunity thus opened for acrimonious attacks.

When the royal supremacy was restored by Parliament after Mary's death, the objectionable word was avoided, and *Governor* substituted for it. Furthermore this title was explained in the *Injunctions* to which reference is made in this Article. They were *set forth* by royal authority in 1559, the first year of Elizabeth, and deal at some length with ecclesiastical arrangements and discipline. The explanation of the oath of supremacy to which the Article refers is as follows: 'Her Majesty forbiddeth all manner her subjects to give ear or credit to such perverse and malicious persons which ... labour to notify to her loving subjects, how by words of the said oath it may be collected, that the kings or queens of this realm, possessors of the crown, may challenge authority and power of ministry of divine service in the Church, wherein her said subjects be much abused by such evil disposed persons. For certainly her Majesty neither doth, nor ever will, challenge any authority, than that was challenged and lately used by the said noble kings of famous memory, King Henry VIII and King Edward VI; which is and was of ancient time due to the Imperial Crown of this realm; that is, under God, to have the sovereignty and rule over all manner of persons born within these her realms, dominions, and countries, of what estate, either ecclesiastical or temporal soever they be, so as no other shall or ought to have any superiority over them.'

The supremacy thus given to the Tudor sovereigns was used by them in an arbitrary manner, under the authority of Acts of Parliament, which gave them very large powers over the Church. The truth seems to be that the boundaries of the ecclesiastical, as well as the civil power of the Crown, were very ill defined. They only became ascertained and limited after the severe struggles which culminated in the civil wars and were terminated by the Revolution.

In the present day the royal supremacy signifies little more than the supremacy of the civil law and courts over ecclesiastical legislation and jurisdiction. Still this general principle is in several respects brought to bear more closely on the Church of England than on other religious bodies within the realm. The latter are free to make any regulations they please for their own internal government, provided they do not contravene the law. The civil power will only interfere with them for purposes of the common peace and order; or when invoked by a member of any such body who alleges that he has suffered wrong by the violation in his case of the laws and regulations of that body. The civil court will then interpose, and compel such a religious body to give to the aggrieved member all the privileges and rights which he enjoys according to the rules under which that body has constituted itself. Striking instances of this have recently occurred in the history of the Free Church of Scotland, and of the Saurin convent case in the Church of Rome. These two ecclesiastical bodies have advanced claims of independence from

the State beyond all others. But the civil courts allowed them no exemption from their jurisdiction.

The position of the Church of England, as established, gives to the civil power yet more control in her case. The Church of England has no power to change any portion of the Liturgy or Articles, or to modify any existing canon, or to enact a new one. The Liturgy is sanctioned by Act of Parliament, and can be altered by no other authority. The Convocation has no power to deliberate on a new canon without license from the Crown, nor has such canon, when agreed upon, any force without the royal assent. The patronage of bishoprics and benefices, generally, has perhaps not much to do with this subject, inasmuch as there might be patronage in a Church not established, as for instance in the case of Colonial Sees, or trustees of dissenting chapels. But the use of the royal supremacy which has attracted most attention, and created most discontent in some quarters, is that the final appeal in ecclesiastical causes has been reserved to the Crown ever since the Reformation. During the papal usurpation the right of appeal lay to the Pope from the bishop's or archbishop's court. Since the declaration of the royal supremacy that appeal has lain not to any ecclesiastical court, but to the Crown. Subsequently to the accession of Elizabeth the Court of High Commission, usually consisting of bishops and ecclesiastical lawyers, exercised this jurisdiction. The Court of High Commission was abolished just before the civil war and was not restored with Charles II. Its functions as a court of appeal were transferred to the Court of Delegates appointed by the Sovereign. This was abolished in 1833, and a committee of the Privy Council was specially organised to exercise jurisdiction in all cases in which the appeal lies to the Crown. The chief judges of the several courts are members of this board, and in ecclesiastical cases it is necessary that at least one bishop shall be present.

It will be observed that whether in the ecclesiastical court or in the Privy Council, eminent lawyers are the judges. The difference is chiefly one of form. In the Bishop's Court, or that of the Arches, the judge sits under the commission of the bishop or archbishop. In the Privy Council all is transacted in the name of the Sovereign; and the final sentence goes forth as the act of the Crown, and not in any ecclesiastical name. It must further be borne in mind that these courts are not legislative. Their province is to interpret the existing law, and that should be deemed the best tribunal which is most competent to investigate and declare the meaning and obligation of the laws.

The Papal Supremacy.

On this point the Article is content simply to deny any jurisdiction of the Pope in this realm of England. But this opens the whole question of his claims. Among the most interesting of modern publications on this subject must be named *The Pope and the Council*, by Janus. It shows with great historical grasp that the claims of the Popedom were unknown to antiquity; and it traces out step by step the story of usurpation and forgery which recounts the growth of the papal power. But it will be more satisfactory if, in accordance with the principles of this work, we take as our guide in dealing with this subject one of the masterpieces of English theology. For an exhaustive and unanswerable argument we select Barrow's *Treatise of the Pope's Supremacy*. Archbishop Tillotson says of it that 'many others have handled the subject before, but he hath exhausted it. ... He hath said enough to silence the controversy for ever, and to deter all wise men of both sides from meddling any further with it. ... There is neither from Scripture, nor reason, nor antiquity, any evidence of the Pope's supremacy; the past and the present state of Christendom, the histories and records of all ages, are a perpetual demonstration against it, and

there is no other ground in the whole world for it, but that now of a long time it hath been by the Pope's janizaries boldly asserted and stiffly contended for without reason.'

The following analysis of the principal portions of Barrow's great treatise may serve to put the student in possession of the main points of the argument. In the Introduction the author takes this preliminary view of the question.

'The disagreement of the Roman doctors about the nature and extent of papal authority is a shrewd prejudice against it. If a man should sue for a piece of land, and his advocates (the notabest that could be had, and well paid) could not find where it lieth, how it is butted and bounded, from whom it was conveyed to him, one would be very apt to suspect his title. If God had instituted such an office, it is highly probable we might satisfactorily know what the nature and use of it were: the patents and charters for it would declare it. Yet for resolution in this great case we are left to seek; they not having the will, or the courage, or the power to determine it. ... Hence even the anathematizing definers of Trent (the boldest undertakers to decide controversies that ever were) did waive this point: the legates of the Pope being enjoined to advertise, that they should not for any cause whatever come to dispute the Pope's authority.'

Barrow then proceeds to examine, with numerous quotations from leading Romish divines and papal bulls, what is the most received doctrine on any supremacy. He admits that there have been and are lower opinions of it in the Roman Church, e.g. that the Pope is subject more or less to a General Council, or to the established canons of the Church. It is notorious that this was maintained in the Councils of Pisa, Constance, and Basil. But although these decisions received papal confirmation, it is certain that they have been repeatedly repudiated. Barrow brings a strong array of papal and other quotations to prove that the papal supremacy has been most generally held to involve universal dominion. In the words of the bull of Pius V against Elizabeth, 'this one [the Pope] he hath constituted prince over all nations and all kingdoms, that he might pluck up, destroy, dissipate, ruinate, plant, build.'

The degree in which temporal power over Christendom is really claimed, is (as is well known) much disputed. Bellarmine vouches for the common opinion of Catholics that 'by reason of the spiritual power, the Pope, at least indirectly, hath a supreme power even in temporal matters.' This, in the opinion of Barrow, really amounts to the same thing. We may now add to this the famous encyclical of the present Pope (1864), distinctly reasserting the subjection of the civil power, and its obligation to punish heresy at the call of the Church. And the decree of the recent Vatican Council has made binding on all Romanists what were previously the private opinions of the Ultramontanes among them. But although the civil supremacy thus claimed makes the assumption the more glaring to those who know history, yet the ecclesiastical supremacy alone, together with its essential consequences, is necessary to Barrow's argument.

To clear thinking, clearness of arrangement is indispensable. Each grows out of, and leads to, the other by an inevitable law. In proceeding to discuss the question of the papal supremacy, Barrow distributes the Roman claim to a perpetual primacy and authority, derived from St. Peter and transmissible to all future ages, into the following seven suppositions: –

- I. That Peter had a primacy over the apostles.
- II. That Peter's primacy, with its rights and prerogatives, was not personal but derivable to his successors.
- III. That Peter was Bishop of Rome.
- IV. That Peter did continue Bishop of Rome after his translation and was so at his decease.

- V. That the Bishops of Rome (according to God's ordinance and by original right derived thence) should have a universal supremacy and jurisdiction over the Christian Church.
- VI. That in point of fact the Roman bishops continually from Peter's time have enjoyed and exercised this sovereign power.
- VII. That this power is indefectible and unalterable.

To fix these seven suppositions carefully in the mind, and to consider them in the light of the scriptural and historical knowledge already (as it is hoped) possessed by the student, must at once in his mind be fatal to the papal claims. The strength of a chain consists in the tenacity and hold of *each* link. If one link fail the chain is broken. If any one of these seven suppositions be false, the argument for the papacy has failed.

The examination of these seven suppositions forms so many sections into which the work is divided. It is proposed now to give the outline of the consideration of each supposition.

Supposition I.

That St. Peter had a Primacy over the Apostles.

There are four kinds of Primacy: –

- I. Of Personal Excellence.
- II. Of Reputation.
- III. Of Order or Precedence.
- IV. Of Power or Jurisdiction.

I. The first of these Barrow grants to St. Peter on the consideration of several passages of Scripture.

II. The second he is also ready to grant, referring to Gal. 2:2, 6, 9, &c.

III. On examining several passages Barrow thinks that St. Peter was the first called to be an apostle – the first who avowed our Lord's divinity – perhaps the oldest – first in the list of the apostles, &c. He would, therefore, grant a sort of precedence of order, but not of degree or rank.

IV. Barrow denies a primacy of jurisdiction on the following grounds: –

1. That there would have been a clear divine commission in such a primacy.

2. That there is no account of the time, manner, &c., of St. Peter being vested with such authority, nor of the nature and rules of such an office.

3. When was such an office instituted? Barrow examines St. Peter's position at different times; and observes that the Lord did enjoin humility towards each other, but never submission to him as superior.

4. Peter's office would have been distinct in character and title from that of the other apostles.

5. No higher title than apostle was known. (Eph. 4:11.)

6. Our Lord positively declared against such a primacy. (Luke 22:24–30.)

7. Particular passages having been examined, it is concluded that no administration was given to St. Peter which was not elsewhere granted to the other apostles.

8. Peter in his two Epistles makes no intimation of such a power.

9. In the Acts of the Apostles, where Christ's words are reduced to action, no trace whatever of such power is to be found, but rather the contrary.

10. In all controversies in Scripture no appeal is ever made to St. Peter's judgment – nothing said of obeying or disobeying him.

11. St. Peter nowhere appears as a judge. Also 1 Cor. 1:12 (I am of Cephas, &c.) is inconsistent with a popedom in St. Peter.

12. The apostles acted independently of each other in Church organisation. This was especially true of St. Paul.

13. The apostolic ministry was exercised through such remote regions that St. Peter could not exercise such a power.

14. The apostles had the only superintendence they needed, the promised Paraclete.

15. St. Paul's conduct towards St. Peter showed that he acknowledged no subjection to him.

16. On the supposition of this primacy, St. Peter ought to have outlived the other apostles. Otherwise, during the last thirty years of the first century, was St. John subordinate to the Bishop of Rome?

17. The other apostles might claim superiority on the same grounds as St. Peter.

18. The Fathers down to Jerome and Chrysostom assert the equality of power and authority among the apostles.

19. The most eminent Fathers, speaking at length of St. Peter, mention no such prerogative.

20. Romish arguments for the superiority of St. Peter are refuted – especially these six particulars are closely examined:

(1) Peter the Rock. Matt. 16:18.

(2) The keys. Matt. 16:19.

(3) Feed my sheep. John 21:16.

(4) Sundry other passages in which Peter is prominent in action.

(5) Patristic testimony.

Supposition II.

That St. Peter's Primacy, with its rights and prerogatives, was not personal, but derivable to his successors.

Whatever may have been the nature of St. Peter's authority, Barrow lays down the following conclusions relating to it: –

I. It was grounded on personal acts and qualities.

II. That all the passages relied upon by Romanists (see above) are accomplished and exhausted in St. Peter's own person.

III. That a foundation is laid once for all; successors must be only superstructure.

IV. That the apostleship was in its nature extraordinary and personal, and therefore not derivable.

V. That the other apostles (as such) had no successors. Hence there could be no remaining primacy among the apostles if there was no such body.

VI. If some privileges of St. Peter are derivable, why not all?

VII. If it be said that the bishops are successors of the apostles, it may be granted in certain respects, they having originally received jurisdiction and authority from the apostles. But inasmuch as they existed *with* the apostles, they cannot, as Bellarmine argues, be properly their successors.

VIII. In the permissible sense of the word, all bishops are equally successors of the apostles.

IX. That this last is the sense in which Cyprian and others hold this transmission.

X. That St. Peter and other apostles transmitted this derivable power equally to the bishop of every church they founded.

XI. That thus Irenaeus and others claim this succession even for bishops of churches not planted by the apostles.

XII. That the distinction claimed by Romanists for something peculiarly transmissible in Peter has no ground.

XIII. That so momentous a claim could not have been avoided by Scripture and by the first Fathers, all of whom are silent upon it.

XIV. If such a succession had been designed and known, it is impossible that Origen, Chrysostom, Cyril, Jerome, &c., expounding the very passages relied on by Romanists, should not in some way have touched upon it.

Supposition III.

That St. Peter was Bishop of Rome.

The following considerations make against such a supposition: –

I. This would confound the two offices of bishop and apostle distinct by God's appointment;–

II. Distinct also by the nature of their duties.

III. For St. Peter to become Bishop of Rome would be as if the King should become Lord Mayor of London.

IV. Having the superior charge, St. Peter would not need the inferior and particular authority.

V. St. Peter's apostleship of the circumcision gave him special charge of the Jews throughout the world.

VI. In fact, as far as we can gather, St. Peter traveled much, and could seldom reside in Rome. Various circumstances related of Peter are here examined to show this.

VII. Repeats III and IV.

VIII. He would have given a bad example of non-residence, censured by all primitive canons.

IX. For St. Peter to be Bishop of Rome would offend against the earliest church rules – especially against:

X. One forbidding the translation of a bishop to another see – for the Romanists make Peter to have been first Bishop of Antioch, then of Rome –

XI. And against another forbidding two bishops to preside in the same city.

Supposition IV.

That St. Peter did continue Bishop of Rome after his translation (from Antioch), and was so at his decease.

The following opposing considerations are alleged: –

I. Early writers give different accounts of this, saying that Peter, or Peter and Paul, appointed other persons to be bishop, Linus, or Clemens, or Anacletus. Hence he was either never bishop or did not continue so, for –

II. This would have been a great irregularity according to early canons which forbade a bishop even at the point of death to appoint a successor.

III. Yet if he were bishop, he divested himself of the office by appointing Linus or Clemens.

IV. In short, either St. Peter retained the episcopacy, in which case there were more Bishops of Rome than one at the same time; or else he resigned it and did not die Bishop of Rome.

V. Hence the ancient expressions about St. Peter's bishopric must be understood of his exercising the apostleship in that city, as Ruffinus says, while there was a bishop there in the proper sense.

VI. The most ancient writers never expressly style St. Peter Bishop of Rome.

VII. The lists of Roman bishops sometimes count in the apostles, sometimes not, as in other churches also.

VIII. Other churches besides Rome were called apostolical sees, as Ephesus, &c.

IX. The apostolical constitutions, recounting the first bishops, never reckon any of the apostles.

X. All apostles had full episcopal power wherever they were as the greater includes the less.

XI. It is argued that James, an apostle, was Bishop of Jerusalem. Answer, The weight of testimony is against James the son of Alphaeus, who was an apostle, being identical with James, the Lord's brother, who was Bishop of Jerusalem. [See Lightfoot's Dissertation, in his *Commentary on the Epistle to Galatians*.] But if he were an apostle, there were special reasons why one of the apostles should have a fixed residence in the city which was the fountain and centre of Christianity.

Supposition V.

That the Bishops of Rome (according to God's institution and by original right derived from thence) should have an universal supremacy and jurisdiction over the Christian Church.

This supposition is treated under the following heads: –

I. The previous four suppositions failing, this of necessity falls to the ground.

II. But admitting those suppositions, this fifth does not of necessity follow. For the jurisdiction of St. Peter might have existed, and might have been transmitted, and yet not to the Bishop of Rome, but, for example, to the whole college of bishops.

III. This kind of transmission of the apostolical authority, in fact, was the doctrine of the early Fathers, especially of Cyprian, the Apostolical Constitutions, &c.

IV. Other bishops of churches of apostolical foundation claimed to be successors of the apostles in the same sense as they admitted the Bishop of Rome to be successor of Peter. Yet they did not claim jurisdiction out of their own diocese.

V. St. James, Bishop of Jerusalem (called an apostle in the Roman liturgy) was more certainly Bishop of Jerusalem than St. Peter was of Rome. And Jerusalem, not Rome, was called mother of all the churches by the Second General Council. Yet the Bishops of Jerusalem, successors of St. James, claimed no general jurisdiction.

VI. As St. Peter founded other churches, and is called by some writers Bishop of Antioch, why should not such succession, if existing, appertain to the Bishop of Antioch?

VII. They say the succession came to Rome by St. Peter's will. It is asked where such will is to be found.

VIII. Bellarmine asserts positively God's command to St. Peter to fix his see at Rome. But afterward overturns this by saying *Non est improbabile* that God commanded, &c.

IX. Antioch at least has a plea for a share in Peter's prerogatives. Query, what share?

X. St. John, perhaps, might have at least equal claim with St. Peter as the surviving apostle.

XI. The Bishop of Jerusalem might put in his claim as successor of Christ Himself, even although St. Peter might have had jurisdiction for his life.

XII. A successor of St. Peter would more fairly be appointed by the suffrages of the whole Church than by the votes of a few persons at Rome for a bishop there.

XIII. If God had purposed such a succession of universal sovereignty, He would not have left the mode of election so uncertain as that to the see of Rome has been.

XIV. Other sovereignties, though assured at first, have passed into uncertain channels. ‘Who is heir-at-law of Adam?’ So there might be a monarchy in Peter and in some successors, and yet by defect of title it might now be lost.

XV. It cannot be proved that God intended the Church to have any one unvarying mode of government.

XVI. In fact there have been long intervals when there was no Bishop of Rome at all. Of which vacancies Barrow gives ten classes.

Direct Arguments Against the Papal Supremacy.

This portion of the Treatise must be very briefly epitomised.

I. The papal supremacy has neither divine nor human testimony, as shown in the following particulars.

1. On such a point God would have plainly declared His will.
2. The New Testament does contain precepts on the order and ministers of the Church, &c. How could a mention of the spiritual monarch have been avoided, if he existed?
3. Obedience to higher powers is inculcated. How could obedience to the universal pastor be omitted?
4. The apostles remember the temporal sovereign; how could they forget the Pope?
5. St. Peter (1 Ep. 2:13–17) urges obedience to kings. Why did he forget his successor? The false decretals everywhere urge obedience to the Pope.
6. St. Paul, writing to the Romans, and also from Rome, omits altogether any privileges of that see.
7. No early Father, though noticing many traditions, has any relating to papal authority.
8. Eusebius gives a full list of Roman bishops, but has nothing about their supremacy.
- 9–11. It is unnoticed by any ancient summary of doctrine, catechetical discourses, or synods.
- 12, 13. Early popes did not assert it, and persons denying popes’ decrees were not called heretics.
14. A universal empire would have been most offensive to pagans, but not one names such a thing.
15. Constantine and other emperors would not have embraced a religion with such claims.
- 16, 17, 18. The apostolical canons and the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita and Ignatius define ecclesiastical orders, but do not name the supremacy.
- 19, 20, 21. Early popes do not use any sovereign style, and other bishops address them as equals.
- 22–26. This dogma is never alleged against heretics by the Fathers, nor by early Popes, all of whom do, however, appeal to Church tradition against heretics.
27. The voluminous works of ancient Fathers from Origen to Augustine, contain no such dogma, not even when treating on *Tu es Petrus*.

II. This pretence is contrary to Scripture.

1. It invades the prerogative of Christ.

2. It makes the Church a temporal dominion.
3. It destroys the brotherly equality of bishops.
4. It denies the Scriptural rights of individual churches.
5. It takes away the liberties of Christian people.
6. It deprives princes of their rights over part of their subjects.

III. As Romanists little regard Scripture proofs, further, it crosses tradition and the Fathers.

1. Usage shows right – there was no such usage.
2. The state of the early Church did not admit it.
3. The Fathers knew nothing above a bishop.

IV. Arguments against the papal supremacy from abstract considerations.

1. The inconvenience of such a dependence of distant Churches; and the impossibility of one man governing an overgrown dominion.

2. By its very nature such a power would be encroaching and exorbitant.
3. It would naturally make religion and doctrine subserve its own interests.
4. Errors so introduced would be unchangeable.

5–7. The officers of such a power would inevitably become corrupt, and such corruption would be perpetual and react unfavourably on the pontiff.

8, 9. It must clash from time to time with civil power, and hence indispose princes to Christianity itself.

10. It is more safe and natural that national Churches should exist independently of each other.

11. Such a power is needless and useless.

V and VI. The ancients considered all the bishops independent in their own diocese and equal amongst each other.

VII. The ancient bishops, when occasion arose, asserted their equality with the Roman bishops.

VIII. The primitive bishops addressed the Roman bishops as ‘brother or colleague,’ and *vice versa*.

IX. The original ground of eminence given to the see of Rome is shown to be its dignity and importance as the capital of the empire.

X. All prerogatives of particular sees were of human ordinance for purposes of order or of local or other convenience. This is proved by a careful examination of the patriarchal and other jurisdictions in the early Church.

Finally, the growth of papal power is historically traced to a concurrence of causes arranged under thirty-six heads.

Supposition VI.

That in fact the Roman Bishops continually, from St. Peter's time, have enjoyed and exercised this sovereign power.

This is a question of fact to decide which the principal branches of sovereignty are individually examined.

I. Such a sovereign would have power to convene supreme councils, &c., and would have used it.

It is proved, on the contrary, that this never was done but by the emperors, and that sometimes on the Pope's application.

II. Such a sovereign would preside over, and moderate in, all general synods. But it is shown that the Emperor or his commissaries presided.

III. Legislative power would belong to such a sovereign of the Church, or at least a power of veto. It is, however, proved that acts of the general councils were ratified by the Emperors, not by the Popes.

IV. Such absolute sovereignty would enact or dispense with laws. The legislative usages of the early Church negatives such a power in the Pope.

V. Such a sovereign as the Pope claims to be would exercise universal jurisdiction. It is shown that such an authority was unknown.

VI. The appointment or confirmation of inferior offices would appertain to such a sovereign. The early modes of electing bishops, popes, and other ministers of the Church being examined, it is shown that the popes had no such power.

VII–X. Powers of censure and deprivation, of absolving and restoring bishops, would appertain to such a sovereign, but it is shown that these belonged to synods. Power also of receiving appeals, and of commissioning other bishops, would belong to him. But it is shown that this only became so by gradual encroachment.

XI. Such a sovereign could be neither censured nor deposed. But popes have suffered both of these.

XII–XIX. Other branches of sovereignty are similarly examined.

All these are claimed by the popes, and are all unknown to the early Church.

Supposition VII.

That the Papal Supremacy is indefectible and unalterable.

Supposing that the Pope had a universal sovereignty, nevertheless change of circumstances might have brought it to an end. But especially departure from the true doctrine of Holy Scripture would terminate it, as Ambrose says, ‘They have not the inheritance of Peter who have not the faith of Peter.’ This leads the author to a detailed statement of the doctrinal errors of the Roman Church, with which the Treatise closes.

The remaining two clauses of the thirty-seventy Article will be examined in connection with the thirty-eighth and thirty-ninth, belonging, as they do, to questions raised by the same classes of schismatics.

PART VI.
CIVIL RIGHTS AND DUTIES.

38. Of Capital Punishments and Military Service.
39. Of Christian Men's Goods.
40. Of a Christian Man's Oath.

ARTICLES XXXVII, and XXXIX.

ARTICLE XXXVII.

*Of Christian men's Goods, which are
not common.*

The riches and goods of Christians are not common as touching the right, title, and possession of the same, as certain Anabaptists do falsely boast. Notwithstanding, every man ought, of such things as he possesseth, liberally to give alms to the poor, according to his ability.

De illicita bonorum communicatione.

Facultates et bona Christianorum non sunt communia, quoad jus et possessionem (ut quidam Anabaptistae falso jactant); debet tamen quisque de his quae possidet, pro facultatum ratione, pauperibus eleemosynas binigne distribuere.

ARTICLE XXXIX.

Of a Christian man's Oath.

As we confess that vain and rash Swearing is forbidden Christian men by our Lord Jesus Christ, and *James* his Apostle: So we judge, that Christian Religion doth not prohibit, but that a man may swear when the Magistrate requireth, in a cause of faith and charity, so it be done according to the Prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth.

De jurejurando.

Quemadmodum juramentum vanum et temerarium a Domino nostro Jesu Christo, et Apostolo ejus Jacobo, Christianis hominibus interdictum esse fatemur; ita Christianorum Religionem minime prohibere censemus, quin jubente magistratu in causa fidei et charitatis jurare liceat, modo id fiat juxta Prophetæ doctrinam, in justitia, in judicio, et veritate.

Notes on the Text of Articles XXXVIII and XXXIX.

The Latin version of these Articles throws no new light upon the English. They are found in their present form in the formulary of Edward as well as that of Elizabeth.

No direct source is suggested for these Articles. But the Augsburg Confession [xvi. De Rebus Civilibus], the Helvetic [xxx. de Magistratu.] and other foreign Reformed Confessions contain similar articles. The calumnies of their Roman opponents made the Reformed Churches very anxious to destroy any possible identification of themselves with the fanatical sects. [See Jewel's *Apology*. P. iii. C. ii. Div. 1.]

Observations on Articles XXXVIII and XXXIX.

For general consideration we take, together with these Articles, the two last clauses of the thirty-seventh. We have thus before us four allied subjects.

1. The lawfulness of capital punishment.
2. The lawfulness of military service.

3. That community of goods is not the Christian law.
4. That judicial oaths are lawful.

The negative to these propositions was maintained by some of those fanatical sects who are grouped together under the name Anabaptists. We may again refer the reader to Article VII above for some account of these disturbing sects. And for further illustration we may quote Luther. 'They teach that the Christian must possess nothing, must take no oath, must hold no magistracy, must give effect to no judgment, must slay none, must not defend himself, must desert his wife and children, with other portentous precepts.' The same errors are copiously illustrated in the Parker Society's series. [See article Anabaptist in the General Index.]

The notions combated in these Articles have been maintained at different periods of history by various obscure sects. The most prominent of those who in modern times have denied the first, second, and fourth of these has been that of the Quakers. They were not, however, within the view of the framers of the Article since they arose subsequently in the time of the Commonwealth. Nevertheless, in the opinion of Mosheim, [*Cent. xvii. II. ii. 6.*] George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, derived his doctrine indirectly from some of the Dutch mystics; and these were certainly connected with some sections of those known as Anabaptists. And it is also true that the mystic and fanatical notions, which had been rife in Germany for some centuries, found expression during the ferment of the Reformation among the Anabaptists. The fanaticism of George Fox was reduced into a philosophical and theological system with much learning and ability by Robert Barclay in 1675. Since that time Quakerism has been a consistent and coherent creed and has dropped all its earlier extravagances. This part of its code of morality will be found considered in the Fifteenth Proposition of Barclay's *Apology*.

The Scriptural Treatment of These Subjects.

Old Testament examples will scarcely suffice under any of these heads, inasmuch as our opponents contend that in this respect the law of the New Testament is in advance of the Old Testament.

It is needful to draw a preliminary distinction between what is lawful to man in his private capacity as an individual, and what is lawful to him as an official person, being, as St. Paul says, a 'minister of God'. The student will recall the argument, pressed so often in Butler's *Analogy*, that the organisation of human society is distinctly from God, inasmuch as it is a necessary consequence of man's nature as a social being formed to live as a member of society. Hence, in a certain sense all rulers of men have responsible duties and powers distinct from their duties as individuals and are, as St. Paul calls them, 'God's ministers.' Care must be taken to allow no confusion of moral principle in drawing this distinction. The law of love and of care for human life, feelings, and happiness binds alike ruler and subject. The *application* of that law in a particular case may require the individual to forgive and the ruler to punish. Without the distinction between the *principle* and the *mode of applying* the principle, many precepts of Scripture (even the simplest) must often be a mass of confusion.

Thus Matt. 5:16 commands us to let our good works be seen; Matt. 6:4 bids us carefully to conceal our alms; Matt. 7:1 absolutely forbids us to judge; Matt. 7:16 gives us a rule by which we may judge. Probably few persons are even for a moment perplexed by these apparent opposites in dealing with the outcomings of certain principles in different cases. But we must style it a perverse treatment of similar unqualified announcements of the Christian duty of individuals which has led to the tenets condemned in the Articles now under consideration.

1. *The Lawfulness of Capital Punishments.*

In the New Testament the leading persons are continually brought into collision with the authorities. It will be uniformly found on examining the instances that the *authority* is recognised, however wrongfully a particular officer may act.

We have further the direct recognition of this exercise of the power. (Acts 25:11; Rom. 13:1–4; 1 Pet. 4:15.)

To this must be added that the original command (Gen. 9:6) was *primaeval*, universal, and distinct from the Jewish law.

2. *The Lawfulness of Military Service.*

The distinction between public and private duties must here be strongly insisted upon. In the execution of justice, which God has in a certain degree committed to man; in the defence of the weak, and of the welfare and happiness of those who are entrusted to the care of the community; some amount of force and violence is, to say the least, necessary. If there is to be a ruler (under whatever name) that ruler must be empowered to exercise force. No property, no right, no happiness can be preserved without it. In a word, without it society could not exist, and the non-employment of force in a sinful world would lead to the reign of wicked force. If, therefore, the law of love, of charity, of the protection of the affections and interests of human life, requires force, it follows that the forceful agent of the ruling power exercises a lawful calling and is empowered to use what amount of violence (even to death) may be requisite to carry out his duty. If this be so, it is impossible to draw the line of right between the employment of the policeman against violence and wrong emanating from a domestic foe to society, and of the soldier against the multitudinous violence and wrong offered by a foreign enemy. This is quite apart from the right or wrong of any particular war. It is probable that these will usually be more or less intermixed in the present confused state of human affairs; and it will follow that in ordinary cases it will not be the soldier's duty to act on his own private judgment as to the merits of the war in which he may be engaged.

These principles being premised, we are prepared to find that the New Testament recognises the military profession as an incident of the present state of man and nowhere hints that it is unlawful.

See the cases of instructions to soldiers, Luke 3:14, and of the centurion received as such into the Church (Acts 10). Many metaphors are drawn from military service in a manner which could scarcely have been done were it unlawful.

Moreover, Rom. 13:4 recognises the use of the *sword*.

3. *That Community of Goods is not the Christian Law.*

This subject is easily dealt with. The *principles* involved will be these: –

1. The ideas of property arising out of the fruits of industry, which are involved in the notion of *society* as it exists by virtue of the *natural* law of God.

2. The necessity for liberality and bounty, which have no place if the Christian has nothing individually his own to give.

3. The exact treatment will be the consideration of the cases in Acts 4:32, 34, 35, and 5:1–10. It will be needful first to examine how far the transactions there described were *required* as a law of the Church (Acts 5:4), and then further to enquire whether in point of fact the community of goods was afterwards imposed as a law in the Churches founded by the apostles and

recognised in the Epistles as existing or needful. There can be no question as to the result of such an examination.

4. *That Judicial Oaths are Lawful.*

It may well appear that, apart from the general question of oaths, the English formula may be thoroughly defended. For it simply consists of a solemn (at least such it ought to be) petition to the Almighty that the person so attesting may speak the truth, or perform the truth in the premises. The simple ceremony added to this of kissing the book of the Holy Gospels, appears (to say the least) an innocent and significant testimony that the person so attested has that faith which is the basis of such an appeal.

But the general lawfulness of judicial oaths is usually defended, apart from the Old Testament, by our Lord submitting to be put on his oath before Pilate (Matt. 26:63, 64). By the language of St. Paul in many passages (e.g. Tom. 9:1; Gal. 1:20, &c.). And by the apparent recognition of such oaths (Heb. 6:16–18).

In this case the declarations in Matt. 5:34–37 and James 5:12 must be classed with many positive assertions alluded to [in section 1. above], which must be understood not by our arbitrary decision, but as they stand qualified by other passages. Nor can there be any difficulty in this to one who has closely studied the manner and the phraseology of Holy Scripture.

[END]