

PART III.
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ARTICLE IX.

Of Original or Birth sin.

Original sin standeth not in the following of *Adam*, (as the *Pelagians* to vainly talk;) but it is the fault and corruption of the nature of every man, that naturally is engendered of the offspring of *Adam*; whereby man is very far gone from original righteousness, and is of his own nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated; whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek *Φρόνημα σαρκός*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire, of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And, although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized, yet the Apostle doth confess, that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin.

De peccato originali.

Peccatum originis non est (ut fabulantur Pelagiani) in imitatione Adami situm, sed est vitium, et depravatio naturae, eujuslibet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati: qua fit, ut ab originali justitia quam longissime distet, ad malum sua natura propendeat, et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat, unde in unoquoque nascentium, iram Dei atque damnationem meretur. Manet etiam in renatis haec naturae depravatio. Qua fit, ut affectus carnis, Graece *Φρόνημα σαρκός*, (quod alii sapientiam, alii sensum, alii affectum, alii studium carnis interpretantur,) legi Dei non subjiciatur. Et quanquam renatis et credentibus nulla propter Christum est condemnatio, peccati tamen in sese rationem habere concupiscentiam, fatetur Apostolus.

Notes on the Text of Article IX.

The Latin text of this Article calls for particular notice. It is a link of connection with the scholastic phraseology of the Middle Ages which must to some extent be understood by all who desire to appreciate the doctrinal position assumed by our Reformers. For they had been trained in the

language and now stood opposed to the system of the schoolmen. The following Latin and English equivalents may be especially noted: –

1. *In imitatione Adami* = ‘In the following of Adam.’
2. *Vitium et depravatio naturae* = ‘The fault and corruption of the nature.’
3. *Quam longissime distet* = ‘Very far gone.’
4. *In Unoquoque nascentium* = ‘Every person born.’ [Obs.: *nascentium* not *natorum*. This accurately implies *at*, not *after*, their birth.]
5. *Renatis* = ‘Regenerated.’
6. *Naturae depravatio* = ‘Infection of nature.’
7. *Affectus carnis* = ‘The lust of the flesh.’
8. *Renatis et credentibus* = ‘For them that believe and are baptized.’ [Obs.: though *renatis* is here used as an equivalent for *baptized*, it does not seem to imply full *spiritual* birth because it is qualified by the word *believe*. All who have that true birth of the Spirit do believe. Faith is the element in which they live.]
9. *Peccati rationem* = ‘Nature of sin.’

N.B. *Peccatum originale* and *Peccatum originis* are equivalent expressions.

This Article has only some slight and verbal differences from the Eighth of 1552. The latter, however, added to the assertion about the Pelagians those words, ‘which also the Anabaptists do now-a-days renew.’ The notice of the Anabaptists under Article VII will sufficiently illustrate this.

The Article is said by Bishop Browne and Archdeacon Hardwick to have been derived from the Augsburg Confession. This assertion can scarcely be maintained in any very exact sense, on a close inspection of the text of the two documents, as may be seen from the following English version of the Second Article of the Augsburg Confession: –

‘They also teach that since the fall of Adam, all men naturally begotten are born with sin, that is, without the fear of God, without faith towards God, and with concupiscence; and that this disease or fault of origin is truly sin, condemning, and even now bringing eternal death to those who are not born again by baptism and the Holy Spirit.

‘They condemn the Pelagians and others who deny that the fault of origin is sin, and in order to diminish the glory of the merit and benefits of Christ, maintain that a man can be justified before God by the power of his own reason.’

The similitude between the English and Augsburg forms does not seem much more than the general family likeness which runs through all the Reformed Confessions.

The Main Divisions of Article IX.

1. Original sin is defined (A) negatively, (B) positively.
2. Its universality and degree.
3. It is in itself deserving of the wrath of God.
4. It remains in the regenerate.
5. Nevertheless, true believers have no condemnation.
6. The indwelling sinful desire, irrespective of indulgence or of action, has the nature or *ratio* of sin.

The student will do wisely if he carefully collects and considers passages of Scripture proving these separate propositions. He will thus obtain clear doctrinal conclusions, instead of confusedly gathering the general notion of man’s sinfulness.

The History of the Doctrine of Original Sin.

It is assumed that the student is familiar with the Oriental notions of the Gnostics and Manichees of the first three centuries as to the connection of moral and spiritual evil with matter.

It is also assumed that the history of the Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian controversies of the fifth century is sufficiently known.

We omit, therefore, further notice of these. But in order to understand the phraseology of this Article and the questions really at issue, we must refer to the schoolmen of the Middle Ages and to the received Roman theology. For the position taken up in this and the following doctrinal Articles, although by no means merely negative, is to a great degree one of antagonism to Rome. These Articles are strongly and scripturally constructive and positive; but in their most definite statements the opposite Romish doctrine seems to be held in view. The schoolmen are named in Article XIII; and indeed it will at once be seen that the Reformers, trained as they were in the scholastic theology, could scarcely avoid writing with a reference, direct or implied, to the terms and principles of that system.

The *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas was dominant in the schools before the Reformation. His doctrine of original sin was more plainly expounded by the great Roman Catholic controversialist Bellarmine at the close of the sixteenth century; and we shall endeavour to give a simple account of it as it lies at the basis of many ill-understood controversies.

It is the less difficult to do so as those divines, whatever their errors may be, are generally very exact in their definitions. [The most accessible books on the subject will probably be Willet's *Synopsis Papismi* and Müller's *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, Clark's translation.]

In order to arrive at a knowledge of the nature of original sin, these authors discuss what Adam lost by the fall. They assert that the original righteousness in which Adam stood was no part of his nature, but a supernatural gift superadded to it. They say that he was created mortal, but had the superadded gift of immortality. Hence the result of the fall was simply a withdrawal of the superadded gifts and a reduction of man to the state in which he would have been without them. Bellarmine thus enunciates this theory: – 'The state of man after the fall of Adam differs from the state of Adam in what was purely natural to him (*in puris naturalibus*) no more than a man who is stripped differs from a naked man. Nor is human nature worse if you take away original sin, nor does it labour more with ignorance and infirmity than it would be and would labour in what is purely natural as it was created.'

The singular comparison used above explains exactly the scholastic idea. Adam was originally (spiritually) naked. He was mortal. He was then clothed with the supernatural gifts of grace and immortality. Upon his fall he was stripped of these, and became spiritually naked and mortal, just as he was created; save that the Almighty now viewed him with displeasure as a creature who had trifled with and lost precious gifts and was destitute of that which he ought to have. Thus original sin is not a positive quality or inherent evil disposition but simply an absence of the original righteousness.

How, then, do these divines deal with a more practical and more formidable question – the most conspicuous and most disastrous feature in man's history – his tendency to sin? On the above theory this, to which they gave the name of *concupiscentia*, used also in our Article, was denied to be sin. For if fallen man stood as Adam stood in all natural respects and was only exposed to wrath as lacking the gifts he had trifled with, then the concupiscence or tendency to sin had in it no necessary guilt. For man was in this respect as God had made him, and that could not be a state of guilt.

It may now be seen in what respect baptism was held by these divines to put away original sin. It is manifest that it does not take away the *concupiscentia*. But it was conceivable that it might restore the supernatural gifts lost by the fall. The gift of immortality, indeed, and exemption from earthly suffering were obviously excepted. But the Catechism of the Council of Trent [Part ii. c. ii. Q. 47.] accounts for this by saying that the baptized members must not be in a more exalted condition than Christ their head was; and that infirmities and sufferings lead the Christian to greater heights of virtue and consequent glory than otherwise he could attain.

We are now in a position to refer to the dogma of the Council of Trent on original sin. There was too much division of opinion in the Council to allow them to agree upon a definition of original sin itself. But the Fifth Session passed this decree bearing on some of the principal points in the present Article: –

‘If any one denies that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, which is conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted; or moreover asserts that the whole is not taken away of that which has the true and proper nature (*ratio*) of sin: but says that it is only cut down or not imputed; let him be anathema.... Nevertheless, his holy Council doth confess and is of opinion that concupiscence, or the fuel of sin, remaineth in the baptized; which being left for the purpose of trial, cannot hurt those who do not consent to it, but manfully through the grace of Christ resist it.... The holy Council declares that the Catholic Church hath never understood that this concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, is called sin because sin is truly and properly in the regenerate, but because it is of sin and inclines to sin. If anyone hold a contrary opinion, let him be anathema.’

This doctrine is substantially that of Aquinas and Bellarmine, but more cautiously worded.

Looking now at our Article, we see the full force of its several parts. It first guards against Pelagianism. It then proceeds to define original sin in language intentionally opposed to the Scholastic and Tridentine doctrine. It omits the question wherein the original righteousness of man consisted. It asserts that original sin is a *vitium et depravatio* of nature in every man. This must be widely different from the mere lack of superadded righteousness, the *privatio* of the scholastics. It says that man has departed in no slight degree, but *quam longissime*, from original righteousness. It says that this infection of nature remains in the regenerate. It further asserts, in opposition to the Roman dogma, that the *concupiscentia* itself, apart from indulgence, has the nature (*ratio*) of sin. It omits the doctrine of the imputation of Adam’s guilt to his posterity, herein agreeing with the Confession of Augsburg, as well as the Helvetic, Saxon, and Belgic Confessions. On the other hand, the Confession of Faith of the Assembly of Divines at Westminster (which is the authorized Confession of the Established Church of Scotland) asserts this plainly (c. vi. 3):

The series of doctrinal discourses by Bullinger, known as his *Decades*, were enjoined as a subject of study upon the less educated clergy in Elizabeth’s time. From *Dec.* iii. s. 4 the following passage is selected on the sinfulness of concupiscence: ‘Concupiscence is a motion or affection of the mind, which of our corrupt nature doth lust against God and His law, and stirreth us up to wickedness, although the consent or deed itself doth not presently follow upon our conceit.... Wherefore that evil and unlawful affection, which is of our natural corruption and lieth hid in our nature but betrayeth itself in our hearts against the pureness of God’s law and majesty, is that very sin which in the tenth commandment is condemned. For although there be some which think that such motions, diseases, blemishes, and affections of the mind are no sins, yet God, by forbidding them in this law, doth flatly condemn them. But if any man doubt of this exposition, let him hear the word of the Apostle, who saith: “I knew not sin but by the law; for I had not known lust except the law had said, Thou shalt not lust. Without the law sin was dead: I once lived without law, but when the commandment came, sin revived, and I was dead.” And again: “The affection of the flesh is death, but the affection of the spirit is life and peace: because the affection of the flesh is enmity against God: for it is not obedient to the law of God, neither can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God.” The affection of concupiscence, therefore, doth condemn us; or, as I should rather say, we are worthily condemned by the just judgment of God for our concupiscence, which doth every hour and moment bewray itself in the thoughts of our hearts.’

The Homily ‘Of the Misery of Mankind’ sets forth from Scripture man’s lost condition and the imperfection of his best works in forcible language. But the style is popular and does not enter into theological distinctions.

There is also a striking passage in Hooker’s *Discourse of Justification* (sec. 7). It does not speak expressly of the sinfulness of concupiscence; but if it be not sin, the language has no force and the ideas are not true: ‘If our hands did never offer violence to our brethren, a bloody thought doth prove us murderers before Him: if we had never opened our mouth to utter any scandalous, offensive, or hurtful word, the cry of our secret cogitations is heard in the ears of God.... Let the holiest and best things which we do be considered. We are never better affected to God than when we pray; yet, when

we pray, how are our affections many times distracted? How little reverence do we show unto the grand majesty of God unto whom we speak! How little remorse of our own miseries! How little taste of the sweet influences of His tender mercies do we feel!... The best things which we do have somewhat in them to be pardoned. How, then, can we do anything meritorious or worthy to be rewarded?... We see how far we are from the perfect righteousness of the law; the little fruit which we have in holiness, it is, God knoweth, corrupt and unsound; we put no confidence at all in it, we challenge nothing in the world for it, we dare not call God to reckoning as if we had Him in our debt-books; for our continual suit to Him is, and must be, to bear with our infirmities and pardon our offences.'

ARTICLE X.

Of free will.

The condition of man after the fall of *Adam* is such that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith and calling upon God: Wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.

De libero arbitrio.

Ea est hominis post lapsum *Adae* conditio, ut sese naturalibus suis viribus, et bonis operibus, ad fidem et invocationem Dei convertere ac praeparare non possit. Quare absque gratia Dei (quae per Christum est) nos praevemente, ut velimus, et cooperante, dum volumus, ad pietatis opera facienda, quae Deo grata sunt et accepta, nihil valemus.

Notes on the Text.

1. The Latin text as compared with the English presents no peculiarity requiring special comment.
2. The student will have noticed that the word *Adam* is Latinized – either thus *Adamus*, *Adam*, as in Article IX; or *Adam*, *Adae*, as in this Article.
3. The ninth Article of 1552, 'of free will,' consisted of the latter half only of the present tenth Article. The opening clause was added in 1562 and is thought to have been derived from the Wurtemberg Confession of 1552, and the latter clause from Augustine *De Gratia* (Hardwick, chap. vi.). In the Articles of 1552 this Article was followed by another dealing with the same subject which is here subjoined:

'Of Grace.

'The grace of Christ, or the Holy Ghost by Him given, doth take away the stony heart and giveth a heart of flesh. And although those that have no will to good things He maketh them to will, and those that would evil things He maketh them not to will the same; yet, nevertheless, He enforceth not the will. And, therefore, no man when he sinneth can excuse himself as not worthy to be blamed or condemned by alleging that he sinned unwillingly or by compulsion.'

The fatalist views held by some of the Anabaptists were, no doubt, the object at which that Article of 1552 was aimed. The Anabaptist excesses were less formidable ten years later; moreover, the doctrine of irresistible grace maintained by many of the Elizabethan divines probably rendered it desirable to strike out the Article in question.

The Principal Topics of Article X.

1. Fallen man cannot himself turn to God.
2. The prevenient or preventing grace of God is needful before our works can please God.
3. This *prevenient grace* give us 'the good will.'

4. The *cooperating grace* is needful after the good will has been received.
The scriptural proof of this Article should be grouped round these main propositions.

Observations on Article X.

The question of the Freedom of Man's Will is involved in philosophical as well as theological difficulties. All philosophical schools of thought – pre-Christian, Christian, and unbelieving – have discussed the various branches of this question. They have debated how far man is a voluntary agent, or the slave of circumstances, or in bondage to his own natural propensities, or the creature of the education to which he has been subjected.

Hence the difficulties belonging to the subject must not be deemed as peculiarly affecting its religious aspect. Whether the Christian solution be accepted or not, no thoughtful man can charge the difficulties on Christianity.

The limits of man's free will were debated before Christianity existed and are now discussed outside its pale.

Hence also the history of the doctrine is too voluminous for our purpose.

The earlier Fathers, especially in their apologetic works, frequently touched on this doctrine. Their main object in such passages was to vindicate the holiness of God, lest He should be made the author of sin; or to repudiate the fatalism of most heathen systems, in order to uphold man's responsibility. They therefore frequently asserted the free will of man, but without discussing its limits or its relation to the doctrines of grace.

The Pelagian controversy first brought out all the points at issue between Christians on this subject into prominent relief. Pelagius, holding that each man was born untainted by Adam's fall, consistently maintained that he could rise to God by his own efforts.

The semi-Pelagians held that man was fallen and needed cooperating grace, but they did not teach the absolute necessity of prevenient grace for turning to God.

Augustine wrote at much length on all points of this controversy in close accordance with the terms of our present Article. One of his treatises is entitled *De libero arbitrio*.

The schoolmen discussed this doctrine, Thomas Aquinas taking the Augustinian view, Duns Scotus approximating rather to semi-Pelagianism.

In the age of the Reformation the question of free will was much debated. All orthodox branches of the Reformation were at first strongly attached to Augustine's doctrines, rejected the notion of the freedom of the will, and denied cooperation on the part of man in the work of conversion. [For authorities on this point see Hagenbach's *Hist. of Doctrines*, § 248.]

The Council of Trent, in this as in other doctrines, endeavoured to mediate between Scotists and Thomists, Franciscans and Dominicans. It enacted the following canon (Session VI. canon 4):

'Whosoever shall say that the free will of man, moved and excited by God, does not at all cooperate with God when exciting and calling, that thus he may dispose and prepare himself for obtaining the grace of justification, and that he cannot dissent though he wills it, but, like something inanimate, does nothing at all, and holds himself merely passive, let him be anathema.'

Also (Session VI. canon 5): 'Whosoever shall say that the free will of man was lost and extinguished after Adam's sin, or that it is a thing of name merely, or a name without a thing, in short, a figment introduced into the Church by Satan, let him be anathema.'

Since the Reformation the Augustinian views have been for the most part discouraged in the Church of Rome. The dominant Jesuit theology has been of a semi-Pelagian cast. In the Reformed Churches whenever the great predestinarian controversy has been revived, the question of man's free will, of which it is a part, has necessarily been prominent. It was so in the seventeenth century when the Puritans, who were usually strong predestinarians, frequently called their opponents *free-willers* as a term of reproach.

Having glanced at the historical aspect of the questions at issue in this Article, we turn to more explanatory matter. We have to deal with metaphysical ideas – the will and its liberty. We have happily some admirably clear comments of Hooker to guide us. [*Ecc. Pol. i. 7.*] ‘Man, in perfection of his nature, being made according to the likeness of his Maker, resembleth Him also in the manner of working; so that whatsoever we work as men, the same we do wittingly work and freely; neither are we, according to the manner of natural agents, any way so tied but that it is in our power to leave the things we do undone... Choice there is not, unless the thing which we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. If fire consume the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before another; and to will is to bend our souls to the having or doing of that which they see to be good. Goodness is seen with the eye of the understanding, and the light of that eye is reason. So that two principal fountains there are of human action, Knowledge and Will; which Will, in things tending towards any end, is termed Choice.’ Concerning Knowledge, “Behold (saith Moses), I have set before you this day good and evil, life and death.” Concerning Will, he addeth immediately, “Choose life”; that is to say the things that tend to life, them choose... The Object of Appetite is whatsoever sensible good may be wished for; the object of Will is that good which Reason doth lead us to seek. Affections, as joy, and grief, and fear, and anger, with such like, being, as it were, the sundry forms and fashions of Appetite, can neither rise at the conceit of a thing indifferent, nor yet choose but rise at the sight of some things. Wherefore it is not altogether in our power whether we will be stirred with Affections or no: whereas Actions which issue from the disposition of the Will are in the power thereof to be performed or stayed. Finally, Appetite is the Will’s solicitor, and Will is Appetite’s controller; what we covet according to the one, by the other we often reject; neither is there any other desire termed properly Will but that where Reason and understanding, or the show of Reason, prescribeth the thing desired.’

Hooker proceeds with a discussion of the numerous causes which pervert, enfeeble, and misguide the Will, making it in so many things subservient to the Appetites. But we have quoted enough for our present purpose.

The Will being thus that in us which has the power of determination to do or not to do any mental or corporal act, the question next before us is this: How far is it, in our present condition, actually free? How far is the Will in a state of Liberty or Necessity, as the two opposite ideas of its condition are usually styled?

It is probably a mode of expression liable to misapprehension to make our statements turn much on the freedom or bondage of the Will. Our Article does not so word it.

Our Will exercises its power of choice according to the tastes, feelings, knowledge, and, in a word, apprehension of what is desirable to, and relished by, the human nature of which it is the determining principle. If therefore the nature be angelic, the Will determines accordingly. If the nature be corrupt and in whatever degree it is so, the Will determines and leads the life and thoughts corruptly.

This state, indeed, may be called one of bondage and is so called in Scripture; but it is not so as being one of blind necessity but as of inevitable consequence from a depraved condition.

The debate therefore seems more properly to belong to Art. IX, and to result from different views of man’s inherent corruption since the fall. And indeed this Article will, on perusal, appear to be a necessary supplement to Art. IX, defining more precisely the helpless condition of fallen man.

The Roman doctrine of original sin as a state of privation only would naturally lead to the Tridentine assertions that man cooperates with grace in preparing himself for justification. On this the remarks of Calvin [*Antidote to Council of Trent. Tracts, vol. iii. p. 47.*] are remarkably clear: ‘We certainly obey God with a will, but it is with a will which He as formed in us. Those, therefore, who ascribe any proper movement of free will, apart from the grace of God, do nothing else than rend the Holy Spirit. Paul declares, not that a faculty of willing is given to us, but that the will itself is formed in us.’ (Phil. 2:13.)

Finally, Delitzsch [*Bibl. Psychology, p. 193.*] thus lays down the distinction of which we have treated:

‘Since the fall, man is free to choose, and for that reason is accountable.... He is free to choose, in so far as no foreign will can irresistibly constrain him to will against his own will. He is not free, in so far as within his own personality this sin which has been allowed by himself rules and enslaves his will.’

In the practical work of the ministry a scholastic mode of treating this subject would be unusually either unintelligible or repulsive. Yet a fairly accurate illustration of the meaning of this Article may be presented in a popular manner in this way. An appeal may be made grounded on the failure of good resolutions, and the utter breakdown of result from numerous wishes to serve God. The reason may be traced to the will, the determining power, remaining with its old bias. And this brings us to the very root of the matter, the absolute necessity for conversion.

It is an obvious but not an unnecessary caution to give, and before treating on this subject it should be carefully considered what is meant by the will, and in what respect either liberty or bondage is predicated of it.

ARTICLE XI.

Of the Justification of Man

We are accounted righteous before God only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ by Faith, and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only is a most wholesome doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.

De hominis justificatione.

Tantum propter meritum Domini ac Servatoris nostri Jesu Christi, per fidem, non propter opera, et merita nostra, justi coram Deo reputamur. Quare sola fide nos justificari doctrina est saluberrima, ac consolationis plenissima, ut in homilia de justificatione hominis fusius explicatur.

Notes on the Text of Article XI.

The Latin text chiefly requires us to notice the prepositions in the following clauses: *for* the merit, *propter meritum*; not *for* our own works, *non propter opera*; *by* faith, *per fidem*; *propter* implies the meritorious cause, and *per* the medium of communication. This is changed in the last clause of the Article into the more direct ablative of the instrument *sola fide*.

The first clause of this Article, compared with the Title and with the last clause, gives us this definition of *justification: the being ‘accounted righteous’*. Since many controversies on this subject (as on others also) turn upon the definition of the terms used, this should be especially noticed.

The eleventh Article of 1552 was more brief than our present form; it was thus expressed: ‘Justification by only faith (*ex sola fide*) in Jesus Christ, in that sense as it is declared in the Homily of Justification, is a most certain and wholesome doctrine for Christian men.’

It is well known that none of the homilies bears of has borne this title. Yet it would seem hardly possible without disingenuity to profess doubt which homily is meant. It cannot be seriously maintained that they who wrote both Articles and homilies, or who in Elizabeth’s time revised and recast this Article forgot or carelessly miscalled the title of the homily. They evidently chose to speak of the one in question, viz., the homily of ‘*The Salvation of Mankind,*’ by a shorter name, describing its main subject, and identifying it more closely with this Article.

The Chief Topics of Article XI.

1. The justification of the sinner is the same thing with God accounting him righteous.

2. The meritorious cause of justification is: A – positively, the merit of Christ; B – negatively, not our works or deservings.

3. The instrumental cause of justification in the sinner himself is faith.

4. Nothing is coupled with faith in this peculiar office which it has in justification.

5. The salutary and consoling nature of this doctrine.

The student will consider and carefully compare these five points with Holy Scripture. Especially he will repeatedly study the grand exposition of this doctrine in the Epistle to the Romans until he has mastered its connection and can quote and apply it readily.

Observations on Article XI.

The doctrine of Justification has of necessity been dealt with more or less by every Christian writer from the first; for the salvation of man is the Gospel itself. The sentiments of writers of all ages might be alleged in a series of quotations, in which every shade of opinion might be found as to the efficacy of faith and works, and as to the nature of Justification. It is satisfactory to know that the very earliest uninspired Christian writer is most distinctly in agreement with our own Article. Thus he writes: – ‘We, too, being called by His will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by ourselves, not by our own wisdom, or understanding, or godliness, or works which we have wrought in holiness of heart; but by that faith through which, from the beginning, Almighty God hath justified all men.’ [Clemens Rom. Ep. i. 32.]

For reasons already given in the Preface it is thought more useful, instead of attempting any general discussion based on a catena of authorities, to present to the student what may be a sufficiently full view of the doctrine of Justification, as held by the leading representatives of the schools of theology with which we are more immediately concerned. The following may suffice for this purpose:

I. The Scholastic Theology.

II. The Decrees of the Council of Trent.

III. Luther.

IV. Calvin.

V. The ‘Homily of Justification.’

VI. Hooker.

VII. Bishop Bull.

The student who has fairly understood the position of these representative men and documents will have an intelligent understanding of the subject, and will be able to enlarge his reading according to his opportunities.

I. *The Scholastic Theology.*

An able and interesting account of the views upon Justification held by the great scholastic writers will be found in Neander’s *History of the Church*, vol. viii. pp. 276–301 (Clark’s Edition). What the student will chiefly require under this head will be the meaning of some scholastic and metaphysical phrases. A few notes of this kind are therefore subjoined:

1. Faith was classified under two heads – *fides informis*, and *Fides formata*. *Fides informis* may be described as the bare admission of a thing as true, corresponding to what we call a dead faith or bare historical faith. It was called unformed, being conceived of as the unorganized shapeless matter out of which true faith is to be shaped. When love with its consequent life and action was added to this, it became *Fide formata*. It may be that what was meant by some of the best of these writers was not very different from what we call a living or divine faith, as distinguished from one which is merely human and dead. But what has been and is now meant by the term *Fides formata* is not faith considered full of life and with a capacity and necessity for producing good works – the *vera et viva fides* of Art. XII – but faith together with love and works considered under one term. It will at once be seen that such a

definition involves most important doctrinal and practical consequences. For justification by faith may thus be verbally asserted, and justification by works intended.

2. In order to the proper understanding of many expressions in our older divines (e.g., *Pearson on the Creed*, Art. I: 'Faith is a *habit* of the intellectual part of man;' 'The belief of the heart is the internal *habit* residing in the soul'), it may be desirable to add a few words on the scholastic use of the word *habit*. The difference between the scholastic use and the modern popular use of the word mainly lies in this. We usually mean by this word some action which by use and repetition has become familiar to us. The philosophy of Aristotle (which was also that of the schoolmen) meant by the word *habit*, not the action but the acquired mental state or condition which has made such an action natural to us. Aristotle held the human soul to be naturally neutral with regard to virtue and vice, and therefore every *virtue*, as distinguished from *virtuous actions*, to be acquired *habit*. [*Ethics*, ii. 5.] Virtue, therefore, he defines as a *habit*. A heathen could go no further. But Christian divines, adopting the same definition, saw in divine grace the power which could implant in the soul *at once* the facility and inclination to virtue, which otherwise could only come *gradually* and imperfectly by a repetition of virtuous actions. Hence Aquinas defines virtue as a *habit*, and a *habit* as 'a quality not easily removed, by which one acts easily and pleasantly.' And again he describes *grace* as a *habit* which is the principle and root of the virtues. Aristotle, then, held that the mental condition, which he styled *habit*, could be acquired. The schoolmen added that it could be *infused* or *implanted* at once by divine power, and that grace (according to their meaning of the term) was such an implanted *habit*. The student will now understand Bishop Pearson's definition of Faith as an 'internal *habit*,' and also the expression *habitual righteousness*, which he will meet with in *Hooker on Justification*.

3. Since many causes usually contribute towards bringing about any result, there was in the schools a fourfold classification of causes derived from Aristotle:

(1.) *The material cause*. – That is, the matter, thing, or substance without the existence of which that we are considering could not be – e.g. without clay or something analogous the work of the potter could not come into existence. Or, to take a different subject, the material cause of the Irish Church Disestablishment Act was the Parliament and that Church.

(2.) *The formal cause*. – The combination of all the necessary conditions which, being present, give that shape to the result which actually comes forth. In the above example the formal cause of the Act was the combination of all the political and social influences and usages which gave the ultimate shape to it.

(3.) *The efficient cause*. – The first mover in the transaction as far back as it requires to be considered. In the above example the efficient cause was the Prime Minister.

(4.) *The final cause*. – The real end, aim, or object for which a thing was done. In the example taken, it was said to be the pacification of Ireland.

This account of causes may be of some use to the student, who may encounter such terms in the older theology, especially in treatises on Justification. In the subsequent account of Tridentine theology, the classification of causes is enlarged by the addition of *meritorious* and *instrumental causes*. They sufficiently speak for themselves. The former really belongs to the class called formal causes, being a necessary condition towards the justification of man in that mode of which it was to take place. The material cause there was no need to name, being man and his sinful state.

II. *The Council of Trent.*

The Council of Trent dealt with the question of Justification in its sixth session. It enacted a lengthy decree on this subject. The following extracts from it will illustrate the main points of the Roman doctrine. The fifth and sixth chapters speak of the necessity for a preparative work of divine grace on the heart. Then the seventh chapter proceeds thus: 'Justification itself follows this disposition or preparation; and justification is not remission of sin merely, but also sanctification and the renewal of the inner man by the voluntary reception of grace and divine gifts, so that he who was unrighteous is

made righteous, and the enemy becomes a friend and an heir according to the hope of eternal life. The causes of justification are these: the final cause, the glory of God and of Christ, and life eternal; the efficient cause, the merciful God who freely cleanses and sanctifies, sealing and anointing with the Holy Spirit of promise, which is the earnest of our inheritance; the meritorious cause, His well-beloved and only-begotten Son, Jesus Christ our Lord, who through His great love wherewith He loved us, even when we were enemies, merited justification for us by His most holy passion on the cross, and made satisfaction for us to God the Father; the instrumental cause, the sacrament of baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which no one can ever obtain justification; lastly, the sole formal cause is the righteousness of God, not that by which He Himself is righteous, but that by which He makes us righteous, with which, being endued by Him, we are renewed in the spirit of our minds, and are not only accounted righteous, but are properly called righteous, and are so, receiving righteousness in ourselves, each according to his measure.'

The tenth chapter asserts of the justified that 'by the observance of the commandments of God and the Church, faith cooperating with good works, they gain an increase of that righteousness which was received by the grace of Christ, and are the more justified.'

The fourteenth chapter says that 'those who by sin have fallen from the grace of justification received may be justified again when, moved by divine influence, they succeed in recovering their lost grace by the sacrament of penance through the merits of Christ. For this method of justification is that recovery of the lapsed which the holy fathers have fitly called "the second plank after shipwreck" of lost grace.'

The sixteenth chapter teaches that, since the justified are united to Christ, 'it must be believed that they are in no respect deficient, but that they may be considered as fully satisfying the divine law (as far as is compatible with our present condition) by their works, which are wrought in God, and as really deserving eternal life to be bestowed in due time if they die in a state of grace.... So that neither is our righteousness set up as if it were actually derived from ourselves, nor is the righteousness of God unknown or disallowed. For it is called our righteousness because we are justified thereby through its indwelling in us; and at the same time it is the righteousness of God because it is infused into us by God through the merits of Christ.'

It will be seen that the Roman doctrine thus defined stands in sharply marked contrast with the doctrine of the English Church. The Roman justification requires, indeed as the Anglican does, a certain preparation of faith and repentance. But it is not a forensic act whereby God imputes or accounts righteousness to the sinner, but an act whereby God infuses *habitual* righteousness. So that the *habits* of faith, hope, and love are thenceforward in the soul; and in respect of, and by reason of these, God views the soul as in itself righteous. Justification is thus identified with sanctification. Not only so, but the sanctification itself is regarded as perfect to such a degree as to endure acceptance with God. The Romanist is accustomed to sneer at the doctrine of imputed righteousness as an unreal mockery. But rightly viewed it unites these two great facts: God's willingness to save the penitent believer, and the believer's imperfect sanctification. Whereas, when we consider that the Roman doctrine holds that all persons are justified (in the sense above defined) in and by baptism, and that God accepts them accordingly on account of the *real*, and not *imputed*, holiness that is in them, it becomes very difficult to reconcile this with the obvious facts of the unholiness of the majority of the baptized. The charge of unreality applies more strongly to such a daring assumption than it can to the doctrine of an imputed righteousness.

III. Luther on Justification.

First in order of time in the reformed theology we must place Luther's doctrine. The student may be reminded how the doctrine of justification by faith was to him the means of deliverance from his own spiritual difficulties and the key to his teaching. His revulsion from the bondage of the Roman theology led him at times to use incautious language as to good works of which his enemies took full

advantage, but no one has in other passages more carefully guarded against Antinomian excesses than he has done. It was Luther who propounded the celebrated maxim that justification by faith was the *articulus stantis aut cadentis ecclesiae*. The following extracts from Luther's commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians will illustrate his views on the subject. 'This is the true mean of becoming a Christian, even to be justified by faith in Jesus Christ and not by the works of the Law. Here we must stand and not upon the wicked gloss of the schoolmen, who say that faith then justifieth when charity and good works are joined, withal.... When a man heareth that he ought to believe in Christ and yet notwithstanding faith justifieth not, except it be formed and furnished with charity, by and by he falleth from faith, and then he thinketh: If faith without charity justifieth not, then is faith in vain and unprofitable, and charity alone justifieth; for except faith be formed with charity it is nothing.' Then follows a passage on the absolute necessity of good works and their right time and place. He then proceeds thus: 'Christ is not the law: he is not my work, or the work of the law, he is not my charity, my obedience, my poverty: but he is the Lord of life and death, a mediator, a Saviour, a redeemer of those that are under the law and sin. In him we are by faith, and he in us. The bridegroom must be alone with the bride in his secret chamber, all the servants and the household being put apart. But afterwards when the door is open, and he cometh forth, then let the servants and handmaidens return to minister unto them: then let charity do her office and let good works be done.... Christ is the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sins of the world. This doth faith alone lay hold of, and not charity, which notwithstanding, as a certain thankfulness, must follow faith.' [Luther on Gal. 2:16.]

'These three things, faith, Christ, acceptance or imputation, must be joined together. Faith taketh hold of Christ and hath him inclosed as the ring doth the precious stone. And whosoever shall be found having this confidence in Christ apprehended in the heart him will God account for righteous. And this acceptance or imputation is very necessary; first, because we are not yet perfectly righteous.... When we have thus taught faith in Christ, then do we teach also good works.' [Luther on Gal. 2:16.]

This was a theme on which Luther was never weary, Christ dwelling in the heart by faith, the true righteousness of the Christian as opposed to the scholastic idea of the infused righteousness of charity, as a *habit* of the spiritual nature of man.

IV. Calvin on Justification.

Calvin has for three hundred years so deeply moulded the theology of a large part of Christendom that his views may be considered as *representative*, beyond those of any writer of his age. We shall first give several extracts from his *Institutes*. 'I must refute the nugatory distinction of the Schoolmen between formed and unformed faith. For they imagine that persons who have no fear of God and no sense of piety may believe all that is necessary for salvation, as if the Holy Spirit were not the witness of our adoption by enlightening our hearts unto faith.... They insist that faith is an assent with which any despiser of God may receive what is delivered by Scripture. But we must first see whether any one can by his own strength acquire faith, or whether the Holy Spirit, by means of it, becomes the witness of adoption.... We in one word conclude that they talk absurdly when they maintain that faith is formed by the addition of pious affection as an accessory to assent since assent itself, such at least as the Scriptures describe, consists in pious affection.... To express the matter more plainly, faith consists in the knowledge of Christ; Christ cannot be known without the sanctification of the Spirit; therefore faith cannot possibly be disjoined from pious affection.' [*Institutes*, III. ii. 8.]

Again, Calvin defines Justification 'as the acceptance with which God receives us into his favour as if we were righteous, and we say that this justification consists in the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ.' [Ibid. III. xi. 3.] He proceeds to argue that this is the proper and most usual signification of the term in Scripture.

In his *Antidote to the Council of Trent* (sixth session), when discussing the Roman doctrine as laid down by that Council, Calvin thus writes: 'it is not to be denied that the two things, Justification and

Sanctification, are constantly conjoined and cohere; but from this it is erroneously inferred that they are one and the same.... There is no dispute as to whether or not Christ sanctifies all whom He justifies. It were to rend the Gospel and divide Christ Himself to attempt to separate the righteousness which we obtain by faith from repentance. The whole dispute is as to the cause of Justification. The Fathers of Trent pretend that it is twofold as if we were justified partly by forgiveness of sins and partly by spiritual regeneration.... I maintain that it is one and simple, and is wholly included in the gratuitous acceptance of God. I, besides, hold that it is without us because we are righteous in Christ only.... I neither can nor ought to let pass the very great absurdity of calling baptism alone the instrumental cause. What then will become of the Gospel? Will it not even be allowed the smallest corner?... Let them cease to sport with trifles such as – man receives faith, and along with it hope and love; therefore it is not faith alone which justifies. Because if eyes are given us, and along with them ears and feet and hands, we cannot, therefore, say that we either hear with our feet, or walk with our hands, or handle with our eyes. Next follows their worse than worthless distinction between an informal and a formed faith.... They are dreaming of that faith devoid of charity which is commonly called by the Sophists informal. For if the doctrine of Paul is true that Christ dwells in our hearts by faith, they can no more separate faith from charity than Christ from His Spirit.... It is, therefore, faith alone which justifies, and yet the faith which justifies is not alone; just as it is the heat alone of the sun which warms the earth, and yet in the sun it is not alone because it is constantly conjoined with light. Wherefore we do not separate the whole grace of regeneration from faith, but we claim the power and faculty of justifying entirely for faith.’

V. *The Homily of the Salvation of Mankind.*

Passing from foreign to English theology, this document first requires our attention. The Article so distinctly refers us to the Homily for a further explanation of the doctrine in question that it becomes of almost equal authority with the Article itself.

That this Homily is meant appears positively, because –

1. The reference being found in King Edward’s Article fixes it to the first book of Homilies only, excluding the second book published in the reign of Elizabeth.
2. There are only twelve homilies in that book, and a glance at the titles will show that this is the only one bearing definitely on the subject.
3. In point the fact, Justification is by name the subject of the Homily from beginning to end as may be seen in every page.

We subjoin an analysis of this treatise. All being sinners, every man needs a ‘righteousness of justification to be received at God’s own hands, that is to say, the forgiveness of his sins and trespasses in such things as he hath offended. And this justification or righteousness which we so receive of God’s mercy and Christ’s merits embraced by faith is taken, accepted, and allowed of God for our perfect and full justification.’

Infants dying after baptism are by Christ’s sacrifice accepted.

They who sin after baptism, on repentance are entirely cleansed.

This justification is *free* to us. Yet by union of mercy with justice a ransom was paid by Christ, who ‘besides this ransom, fulfilled the law for us perfectly.’

‘So the grace of God doth not shut out the justice of God in our justification, but only shutteth out the justice of man, that is to say, the justice of our works, as to the merits of deserving our justification. And, therefore, St. Paul declareth here (Rom. 3, 12, 10) nothing on the behalf of man concerning his justification, but only a true and lively faith, which nevertheless is the gift of God, and not man’s only work without God. And yet that faith doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God, to be joined with faith in every man that is justified; but it shutteth them out from the office of justifying. So that although they be all present together in him that is justified, yet they justify not altogether; neither doth faith shut out the justice of our good works, necessarily to be done afterwards

of duty towards God ... but it excludeth them, so that we may not do them to this intent, to be made just by doing of them.’

In consequence of their imperfection our good works cannot justify us.

Christ has fulfilled the law as well as paid the ransom, so that in Him we fulfill the law.

Three things are required in justification:

1. God’s mercy.
2. Christ’s justice.
3. A true and lively faith out of the which faith springs good works.

The way of Faith is the way of Grace.

Twelve ancient authors from Origen to Bernard are next quoted and referred to as bearing out these statements.

‘This saying that we be justified by faith only, freely, and without works, is spoken for to take away clearly all merit of our works as being unable to deserve our justification at God’s hands, and thereby most plainly to express the weakness of man and the goodness of God; the great infirmity of ourselves, and the might and power of God; the imperfection of our own works, and the most abundant grace of our Saviour Christ; and, therefore, wholly to ascribe the merit and deserving of our justification to Christ alone, and his most precious bloodshedding.’

This is the doctrine of Scripture and antiquity. It exalts Christ and lowers man. He who denies it is an adversary to Christ.

The importance of clearly holding this doctrine is urged lest carnal men abuse it to live a worldly life, therefore a further explanation of it is added. ‘Justification is not the office of man but of God.... It is not a thing which we render to Him, but which we receive of Him, not which we give to Him, but which we take of Him by His free mercy, and by the only merits of Christ.’

Hence this doctrine ‘is not that this our own act to believe in Christ, or this our faith in Christ which is within us, doth justify us, and deserve our justification unto us.’ But that, although we have all virtues and good deeds, yet we renounce their merit as ‘things far too weak and insufficient and imperfect to deserve remission of our sins and our justification,’ and therefore we must trust only in God’s mercy and Christ’s sacrifice.

Faith, like John the Baptist, puts us away from itself to the Lamb of God.

Man’s duty to God follows.

Not to strive how little good we may do, much less to live carnally. A faith that so acts is a counterfeit, dead and devilish.

For even devils believe the facts of Christ’s life, &c. ‘The right and true Christian Faith is not only to believe that holy Scripture and all the Articles of our Faith are true, but also to have a sure trust and confidence in God’s merciful promises to be saved from everlasting damnation by Christ: whereof, doth follow a loving heart to obey His commandments.’

No devil or man living an ungodly life can have this faith.

These things rightly considered stir us up to good works.

VI. Hooker on Justification.

Hooker has been spoken of by so many divines of all shades of opinion as a true representative of the Reformed English Church after the first head of controversy had passed that his writings are generally supposed to carry more weight than those of other divines considered as individuals. We, therefore, next subjoin the following epitome of his opinions on this subject.

Analysis of Hooker’s Discourse on Justification.

‘The wicked doth compass about the righteous’ (Hab. 1:4).

Chapter II. – All have sinned, No human being is naturally void of unrighteousness, not even the Blessed Virgin. We have, therefore, to show how Christ is made our righteousness.

Chapter III. – The different kinds of righteousness are thus defined:

1. The glorifying righteousness in the world to come which is both perfect and inherent.
2. The righteousness whereby we are here justified, which is perfect, but not inherent.
3. The righteousness whereby we are sanctified, which is inherent, but not perfect.

[N.B. – ‘Inherent,’ from its derivation, implies that which abides in us so closely as to become part of ourselves and to belong to us. Accordingly in other words, the justifying righteousness above spoken of is the righteousness of Christ not in us or of us, as being or becoming part of our own nature, but as imputed to us *ab extra*, and appropriated to us by genuine justifying faith. But the sanctifying righteousness is that which is wrought in us by the Holy Spirit working in and with us. So far as this is the work of the Spirit it must be perfect; so far as it is the result of our cooperation with the Spirit, it must be imperfect. This righteousness is manifestly *ab intra*, inherent, abiding in us, and growing in us.]

Chapter IV. – How far we agree with Rome.

1. That infants before actual sin are by nature corrupt.
2. That in making men righteous none do efficiently work with God.
3. That none ever attained to righteousness but by the merits of Christ.
4. That Christ as God is the efficient cause, and as man the meritorious cause of our justification.
5. But that something is required by which his merits are to be applied to us for our justification.

Chapter V. – Where we disagree with Rome on justification.

‘We disagree about the nature and essence of the medicine whereby Christ cureth our disease; about the manner of applying it; about the number and the power of means which God requireth in us for the effectual applying thereof to our soul’s comfort.’

They say that justifying righteousness is a divine quality infused into the soul, capable of increase or diminution, so that we are more and more justified by receiving more of it. That the first justification takes place in baptism, and then by good works more grace is received, and the justification is increased, which they call the second justification. If the justification is diminished by venial sins, the decay may be repaired by holy water and the like. If it be lost by mortal sin, it may be restored by the sacrament of penance, howbeit, not so perfectly but that purgatorial pains are needful.

Chapter VI. – The error of the Romanists in their doctrine of justification is argued from the following passage. Phil. 3:8–9: ‘And be found in him, not having mine own righteousness which is of the Law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God through faith.’ ‘Whether they speak of the first or second justification, they make the essence of it a divine quality inherent. They make it righteousness which is in us. If it be in us, then it is ours as our souls are ours.’.... But from the above passage it appears that ‘the righteousness wherein we must be found, if we will be justified, is not our own; therefore, we cannot be justified by any inherent quality. Christ hath merited righteousness for as many as are found in Him. In Him God findeth us if we be faithful, for by faith we are incorporated into Christ. Then although in ourselves we be altogether sinful and unrighteous, yet even the man who is impious in himself – full of iniquity, full of sin – him, being found in Christ through faith, and having his sin remitted through repentance; him God beholdeth with a gracious eye, putteth away his sin by not imputing it, and accepteth him in Jesus Christ as perfectly righteous, as if he had fulfilled all that was commanded him in the Law. Shall I say more perfectly righteous than if himself had fulfilled the whole Law? I must take heed what I say; but the Apostle saith, “God made Him to be sin for us, who knew no sin, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him.” Such we are in the sight of God the Father as is the very Son of God Himself.’

Thus the Church of Rome in teaching justification by inherent grace, perverts the gospel.

The righteousness of sanctification is inherent, and cannot exist without works; it is different in its nature from the righteousness of justification; we are righteous in *one* way by the faith of Abraham; in the *other* way, except we do the works of Abraham, we are not righteous. Of the one, says St. Paul (Rom 4:5), ‘to him that worketh not, but believeth, his faith is counted for righteousness.’ Of the

other, St. John says (1 John 3:7), ‘he that doeth righteousness is righteous.’ Thus also St. Paul is reconciled with St. James, if the former is speaking of justifying righteousness without works, and the latter of sanctifying righteousness with works.

In Romans 6:22 St. Paul distinguishes between these two kinds of righteousness; ‘being made free from sin’ – this is the righteousness of justification – ‘ye have your fruit unto holiness’ – this is the righteousness of sanctification.

Chapter VII. – The imperfection of sanctifying righteousness. All Christians have the title of saints because it is concluded that they are partakers of the sanctifying righteousness; some, however, have no more of this than the title, and the best are very far from perfection and dare not rely for salvation on their greatest advances in this inherent, sanctifying, righteousness, but only on the *justifying* righteousness, whereby God does not impute their trespasses unto them.’ [This noble chapter should be thoughtfully read throughout for its truly spiritual perception of the imperfection of man’s highest holiness.]

Chapter VIII.–XX., inclusive. – The question whether Roman Catholics can be saved, being in error on the doctrine of justifying righteousness. Hooker concludes that they may, through God’s mercy, provided they hold fast by the foundation of Christ crucified for our sins.

Chapter XXI. – ‘We have already showed that there be two kinds of Christian righteousness; the one without us, which we have by imputation; the other in us, which consisteth of faith, hope, and charity, and other Christian virtues, and St. James doth prove that Abraham had not only the first, because his faith was counted to him for righteousness, but also the second because he offered up his son. God giveth us both the one justice and the other; the one by accepting us for righteous in Christ; the other by working Christian righteousness in us.’

The efficient cause of the unrighteousness of sanctification is the spirit of adoption in our hearts; it consists of the infused virtues proper to saints, love, faith, hope, &c., which the Spirit brings with it from the first moment of its abode; the effects of it are good works, fruits of the Spirit.

We may therefore divide the righteousness of sanctification into two kinds, analogous to the root and the fruit; these are called *habitual* and *actual*.

First, *habitual*; [See above Note on Habits, under Article XI, the Scholastic Theory.] the inward graces of holiness with which the soul is imbued when it becomes a temple of the Holy Ghost. This we hold the thief on the cross possessed.

Second, *actual*; that which comes out in act and adorns the life. This the thief on the cross could scarcely possess.

The question may be asked, which do we first receive? It is answered, the imputed righteousness of Christ to our justification, and the *habitual* righteousness of sanctification we must receive at one and the same time, when we are made temples of the Holy Ghost; but though we receive them at the same time, they are not one and the same thing.

But the *actual* righteousness of sanctification must of necessity follow afterwards in point of time.

So far a perfect identity of doctrine on the essential point of justification will have been seen in the reformed theology. With very slight variation of language, Luther, Calvin, our Homily, and Hooker are at one with each other and with our present Article. Justification is kept distinctly apart as a theological term and spiritual fact from sanctification. The essence of the latter is habitual holiness inherent in the soul, and infused into it by the Holy Spirit, and capable of many degrees. Justification, on the other hand, is ‘not the office of man, but of God.’ It is the act of God towards us by which He not only forgives our sins, but also accounts us righteous. This, considered as a *spiritual fact*, is quite distinct from the former. Therefore to confuse justification with sanctification is not a pardonable blunder in mere theological phraseology, but it mistakes two distinct spiritual processes upon and in the soul of man. It therefore destroys the clearness of the anatomy of the divine life in the soul, and proportionally renders less certain the Christian hope. Yet the other point, brought out no less distinctly in the above extracts, is of equal importance. Justification cannot be divorced from

Sanctification for a *moment*. As Hooker says, they ‘are received at one and the same time.’ As Calvin tersely expresses it: ‘It is faith alone which justifies, and yet the faith which justifies is not alone.’ It is with these as with the great doctrine of the Incarnation. Separate the two natures in Christ and we have lost our One Saviour. Confuse them and we have another who is not He. So fundamental is the difference of definition which separates us from the doctrine of Rome in the great fact of our justification. The doctrine of the Reformation, thus defined, continued to be held with none but insignificant variations until the reign of Charles I was well advanced. Nor had there even then arisen any other defined school of theology on this head. To this Bishop Bull may himself be called as a witness, ‘that we fall not into the same error as Luther and most of our own divines after his time.’ [*Justif.* I. iii. 3.] But in the year 1669, Bull, afterwards Bishop of St. David’s, published his *Harmonia Apostolica, or Agreement of St. Paul with St. James on Justification*. This was the legitimate fruit and consequence of much of the English theology of the preceding forty years. A large part of the English clergy no longer used the language of the Reformation on this doctrine and was ripe to receive Bull’s teaching. Its publication was an era in English theology. The following sketch is meager, but the work itself does not possess the fullness and richness of our previous authorities, and we can do no more than attempt fairly to exhibit its main positions.

It is divided into two dissertations. The first is on St. James 2:24, and the second on Romans 3:28. The object of the whole work is to reconcile these two statements, which is done by accommodating the second to the first.

Dissertation I.

‘Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only’ (James 2:24).

Chapter I. – The word *justify* is defined in a legal sense, as ‘meaning to acquit or pronounce guiltless.’ This would appear to fall short of the definition in Article XI. But it is supplemented (Ch. i. § 5) by the further statement that ‘the word *justify* both with St. Paul and St. James has exactly the same force as *to impute a reward, to impute righteousness, and to impute for righteousness*. Now it is well understood that *imputation* denotes the act of God regarding a man as just, not making him just.’ It follows that the word *justify* is used in the sense of our Articles, and of the Protestant writers. It is taken to be equivalent to forgiveness of sin and *accounting* (not *making*) the sinner righteous.

The preposition *by* in the passage from St. James is further defined as taken in a lower sense, as signifying the means or condition, not the meritorious or principal cause. Since neither faith nor works can be a principal cause or a cause at all, unless inaccurately speaking. The true cause is the grace of God, obtained through the merits of Christ.

In the remaining five chapters of this dissertation the author argues in favour of the absolute and unqualified acceptance of the passage from St. James, as a distinct theological proposition, setting forth the true Christian doctrine that a Christian ‘is justified by works and not by faith only.’ The following is a sketch of his argument.

Chapter II. – Bishop Bull alleges those numerous passages of Scripture ‘which speak generally of good works, or piety, sanctity, and obedience (all which have the same meaning) as the conditions necessarily required that anyone should be acceptable unto God to salvation, i.e. be justified, for these are synonymous terms.’ Accordingly, whatever is said in Scripture to be necessary to *salvation* he takes to be equivalent to being necessary to *justification*. He denies to faith any special and peculiar force as an instrument in justification, urging that repentance, which includes at least eleven works (e.g. contrition, humiliation, confession, supplication, love of God, &c.), is equally necessary. [It is hoped that the student will see what a doctrinal confusion this is. Repentance can conduce to justification only in so far as it brings to Christ, at which moment it passes into the substance of faith, and this uniting the sinner to Christ, he is justified according to the words of our Saviour (John 3:18).]

Chapter III. – Sets forth the Decalogue, as explained and perfected by Christ, as the law by which Christians will be acquitted or condemned, and concludes that by faith without works no one is justified.

Chapter IV. – Faith is analysed into its three acts of knowledge, assent, and confidence. Each of these is asserted to be possible to evil men, and so have no necessary justifying power.

Chapter V. – The future judgment is said by Scripture to be according to our works. It is inferred that justification now must follow the same law.

Chapter VI. – It is argued that Protestant divines confess that the faith which justifies must be a living faith, that is, productive of good works. Therefore, on their own showing, good works are necessary to salvation or, in other words, are necessary to justification.

The foregoing reasoning of Bishop Bull seems to reduce theology into a hopeless chaos. In Holy Scripture the words justify, sanctify, save, faith, works, obedience, salvation, &c., are not used indiscriminately. Each has its own place and degree of necessity in the great and complex work of the sinner's salvation. Salvation is really the work of the Third Person of the Blessed Trinity, convincing the soul of sin, revealing to it Christ with a peculiar and distinct perception of the necessity and sufficiency of all that He has done, and all that He is, in order to the salvation of that soul for ever. This work is not one that terminates. The Holy Spirit, which has wrought this, continues to dwell in that soul, which is now a 'temple of the Holy Ghost.' Consequently, though with a sad residue and admixture of the fallen nature which remains beside it, good thoughts, words, and works of necessity flow forth from that pure fountain. Salvation, therefore, is one work and act of the great vivifying and renewing Spirit. But viewed in its complex action upon man, it is susceptible of a great number of divisions. Repentance, faith, obedience are all necessary to it. To say otherwise were, in Calvin's words, before quoted, 'noting else than to rend the Spirit,' who is One. But they are not all necessary precisely in the same office. And for the work of Justification it has pleased God to set apart faith, 'that it might be by grace,' and that the sinner may learn that union with Christ is the sure and only condition of the life of the saved.

The second dissertation takes for its text Romans 3:28: 'Therefore we conclude that a man is justified by faith without the deeds of the law.' It is much longer than the first. Its object is to bring the meaning of St. Paul to a coincidence with the doctrine laid down in the first dissertation as the right interpretation of St. James.

The three first chapters discuss some of the principal modes for reconciling the conflicting passages in St. Paul and St. James which have been given by different divines and are here rejected.

The fourth chapter sets out with the principle that 'the words of St. James being express, clear, and evident' ... 'whatever obscurity there is must be attributed to the Epistles of St. Paul.' It is then decided that the ambiguity lies not in the word *justifies*, but in the words *faith* and *works*, which 'St. Paul uses with a different meaning upon different occasions.'

The following definition is then laid down. 'Faith, to which justification is attributed by St. Paul, is not to be understood as one single virtue, but denotes the whole condition of the Gospel covenant; that is, comprehends in one word all the works of Christian piety.' It is added somewhat naively, 'If we prove this point, we shall find less difficulty with the other passages of St. Paul.' The general method used to establish this sweeping assertion is to allege such passages as these – 'But they have not all obeyed the Gospel, for Esaias saith, Lord, who hath believed our report.' On which Bishop Bull thus comments, 'Who does not here perceive that to "believe" and to "obey" the Gospel signify the same thing with St. Paul?' It is a strange mode of reasoning to confuse the *result*, *obedience*, with the *ground* of it, which is *faith*. Such a theology cannot be safe to follow.

This meaning of the word faith having been further pressed in the fifth chapter, Bishop Bull proceeds in the sixth chapter to St. Paul's use of the word *works*.

The sixth chapter begins thus: 'There is another difficulty in the word *works* as used by St. Paul, and this is indeed the consequence of what we have already proved; namely, that Faith in St. Paul's

Epistles means all the works of Christian piety. This being allowed, it is certain that the works which St. Paul excludes from justification are not all kinds of works, but of a certain description only. Distinctly to explain of what kind these are is a matter of no little labour, and we have now arrived at the chief difficulty of our work.' This 'difficulty' is solved by pronouncing the *works* excluded by St. Paul to be 'the works prescribed in the Mosaic law' in the case of a Jewish convert; and in the case of Gentile converts to be the works done by the light of natural conscience and by human strength only.

A discussion of this view of *works* from various passages in various lights occupies the greater part of the remainder of the work. The argument by which he seeks to evade what the Apostle says of boasting being excluded by the law of faith, though not by the law of works (Rom. 3:27), is the same as that of the Romanists. 'Those good works which we perform are not so much ours as those of God within us. But no man can properly boast before God of that which is owing to God.' The student will discern the fallacy of this and the contrast with Hooker's doctrine on the same subject (see above, Hooker on Justification, Chapter VI.) At the same time Bishop Bull protests warmly against the Roman doctrine of the *merit* of good works, since 'the right which the good works of the just have to eternal life is founded only in the Gospel covenant and promise.'

The Eleventh Article is disposed of in this summary manner. 'Although other virtues are no less necessary to justification than faith, and faith in reality has no more effect in it than any other virtue; but yet of all the virtues faith is that one by which we embrace the Gospel promise, by which promise we are justified: therefore by a convenient phrase, our justification may be and is usually attributed to faith only.' If the solemn statements of our Articles may be passed over as 'convenient phrases,' any lengthened commentary on them would be superfluous. In this case we have the comment on the phrase furnished by the homily to which the Article itself refers us for further explanation of its meaning. 'Faith doth not shut out repentance, hope, love, dread, and the fear of God to be joined with faith in every man that is justified; but it shutteth them out from the office of justifying.'

Lastly, Bishop Bull cautions the reader to distinguish between the first and second justification. 'It must be understood that only the internal works of faith, repentance, hope, charity, &c., are absolutely necessary to the first justification; but the other external works, which appear in outward actions, or in the exercise of the above-named virtues, are only the signs and fruits of internal piety, being subsequent to justification and to be performed provided opportunity be given.'

Nelson in his *Life of Bishop Bull* says of the controversy raised by this publication that 'in a very few years the strife ceased, forasmuch as the victory was so complete, as none were found able to rally their forces in this cause against our judicious harmoniser.' This is true, though it was by no means due entirely to Bishop Bull. The nonjurors and high churchmen of William's and Anne's days belonged to the Laudian and Sacramental School, to which this view of justification was exceedingly congenial. The other chief section of the clergy, comprising such men as Tillotson and Burnet, was called the Latitudinarian party. In their efforts for comprehensiveness they were only too much inclined to break down the barriers of doctrine. How far Burnet sympathized with such views as those of Bishop Bull may be judged from his definition of *faith*, when writing on the Eleventh Article. 'Faith, in the New Testament, stands generally for the complex of Christianity in opposition to the Law.'

Such doctrines easily led to the condition of semi-Socinianism and apathy into which the Church of England lapsed under the first Georges. And when the great Reformation doctrine of justification by faith was again preached by the forerunners of the Evangelical revival in the last century, it was received by the mass of the so-called orthodox divines as though some new and strange heresy were promulgated. A few concluding notes and cautions may be added.

1. Holy Scripture and our Church know nothing of any justification but one. Before this no works acceptable to God are done (Art. XIII), and after it the Christian is fruitful in good works Art. XII). It is not possible, unless by arbitrary assertion, to distinguish the justification in the Eleventh Article

from that in the Twelfth and Thirteenth. The Romanist distinction of a first and second justification being repudiated, many evasions of the Eleventh Article fall away at once.

2. Romanist divines and their followers in attacking the doctrine of justification by faith have always found it convenient to strip faith as far as possible of every moral attribute, and to reduce it as nearly as may be to a bare assent to the understanding and the will. They also omit what we consider the essence of the doctrine that the faith which justifies is not alone in the heart, but is joined with contrition and other graces, and is the direct gift of the Holy Spirit to the heart in which it abides.

We always distinguish it, therefore, from that faith which is the act of the human reason and will.

3. Protestant divines, who have not accepted this doctrine simply understood, enlarge the idea of faith so as to make it include the whole or a large part of Christianity, instead of perceiving that where faith in its true sense is, there the Holy Spirit dwells, and therewith all of Christianity must be associated. It may not be necessary for all minds to grasp the distinction. But there can be no clear theology and therefore no clear and salutary teaching unless the Christian minister discerns it plainly.

4. As a test of Bishop Bull's exegesis of the word *faith* as used by St. Paul, the test of substitution may be applied. Occasionally, no doubt, this word is used objectively of the thing believed, as all words of this class are (e.g. Gal. 1:23). But it is most commonly used subjectively, and it occurs (it must be remembered) sometimes in the form of the verb, sometimes in the form of the noun. We may give two instances which may be multiplied to any extent. St. Paul perceived that a certain cripple 'had *faith* to be healed' (Acts 14:9). Did he perceive that he had 'the complex of Christian graces,' or 'all the works of Christian piety'? Again he said to the jailor at Philippi, 'Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved' (Acts 16:31). Is it possible to substitute for the word believe any such complexity or periphrasis? or was it not a single spiritual act to which the man was called?

Again, with regard to the use of the word *works* in the Epistles to the Romans and Galatians; were the works of the ceremonial and strictly Mosaic law those which were repudiated as capable of justifying the sinner, or was it not rather the moral law, whether written in the conscience or enjoined in the Mosaic law (Rom. 3:10–18)? This subject should be carefully studied with a very close examination of those epistles, 'calling no man master' in this vital matter.

5. He who would form a scriptural system of doctrine, on which he might feel that he could rely, should frame for himself a tabulated system of passages with the help of a Greek concordance. An English one will not suffice because our translators have not adhered to one rendering of the same word.

Such a table would include these words: δίκαιος, δικαιοῦμαι, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, πίστις, πιστεύω, πεποιθήσις, λογίζομαι.

It need scarcely be noted how very rarely this is done; in other words, how rarely our divines make a thorough examination of Scripture for themselves.

6. It may be useful to bring together some of the principal methods of interpreting St. James 2:24.

(1.) Bishop Jewel and others held that St. James refers to evidential justification; i.e. to justification, as it may be manifested to man, which cannot be without works (Matt. 7:16), inasmuch as faith is invisible; while St. Paul speaks of justification before God.

(2.) Hooker, as we have seen, holds that St. James means the righteousness of sanctification. But it may be asked if the New Testament anywhere else uses the word *justify* in this sense.

(3.) Bishop Bull and others take St. James absolutely and stretch St. Paul's use of the word *faith* so as to include works.

(4.) Many hold that St. James is arguing with false professors on their own grounds; and, taking up their own word *faith* in their sense of it, shows that on their meager notion of faith, justification by faith only would not convey the meaning of Scripture.

ARTICLE XII.

Of Good Works.

Albeit that Good Works, which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's Judgment: yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known as a tree discerned by the fruit.

De bonis operibus.

Bona opera, quae sunt fructus fidei, et justificatos sequuntur, quanquam peccata nostra expiare, et divini iudicii severitatem ferre non possunt; Deo tamen grata sunt, et accepta in Christo, atque ex vera et viva fide necessario profluunt, ut plane ex illis, aequae fides viva cognosci possit, atque arbor ex fructu judicari.

Notes on the Text of Article XII.

The following phrases may be noticed on comparing the Latin with the English: '*justificatos sequuntur*' stands for 'follow after justification.' '*Expiare peccata*' presents a more definite idea than the English 'put away sins.' '*Viva*' is rendered 'lively' as in 1 Pet. 1:3. It will be observed that in the Eleventh Article *Faith* is used without any qualifying epithet, but there can be no reasonable doubt of the identity of the *Faith* spoken of in both these Articles, and, therefore, this epithet *lively* must be understood as equally qualifying the word *Faith* in both.

This Article was added in 1562, not having been one of the Forty-two Articles of 1552. It is said by Archdeacon Hardwick [*History of the Articles*, p. 379.] to have been adapted from the Wurtemberg Confession, but the resemblance is rather slight, and the language of Augustine has been probably the common basis. The Elizabethan divines no doubt had in view the Antinomian Anabaptists as well as the Romanists in the statements of this Article.

The Main Divisions of Article XII.

1. The imperfection before God of the good words of men faithful and justified.
2. The nature and ground of the regard God has to such works.
3. The relation of good works to faith.

The Scripture proof may conveniently and clearly be grouped round these principal divisions.

Observations on Article XII.

The Pelagian and Semi-Pelagian controversies of necessity involved the question of the value of the good works of the Christian. We do not recur to the history of those controversies. The teaching of the scholastic divines on the merit of good works is deferred until we come to the Thirteenth Article. We pass on to the Council of Trent (Session VI. canon 32), 'Whosoever shall say that the good works of a justified man are in such a sense the gifts of God that they are not good merits of the justified man himself, or that a justified man by good works which are done by him through the grace of God, and the merits of Jesus Christ, of whom he is a living member, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the actual attainment of eternal life if he die in grace together with increase of glory, let him be anathema.'

It will scarcely be necessary to produce authorities in addition to those already brought forward under the Eleventh Article. The passages from the Homily, from Hooker, and from Bull sufficiently cover the ground of this Article also. The student who desires to read more on the Roman opinions of merit in the good works of the justified will find ample information in that treasure-house of learning, *Field of the Church*. [Book iii. Appendix, chap. xii.]

This Article sets the seal on the preceding, inasmuch as good works are said to follow justification and cannot therefore concur to obtaining it. Bishop Bull and others of his school evade this difficulty by their doctrine of the first and second justification. He says that eleven works of repentance are necessary with faith to the first justification, and that to the second justification many more works are necessary and that of these Article speaks.

Bishop O'Brien well observes: [*Nature and Effects of Faith*, p. 422.] 'What foundation does this Article or any other Article supply for this distinction of a first and second justification? ... If there be another justification, the Articles do not speak of it or even glance at it. They tell us, indeed, of a justification before which no good works are done (Art. XIII), and after which all good works are done (XII). But they do not intimate to us in any way that this is but inchoate, and that there is another justification to the obtaining of which all these good works are necessary.'

It may be further noted that as good works are said in this Article to be the fruits of faith, they are distinguished from faith as the fruit is distinguished from the tree. Does not this cut up by the roots the attempt to explain faith in Art. XI as including works? Or can *faith* in Art. XI be taken in one sense as faith together with works and in Art. XII in another sense as distinguished from the works which it produces?

ARTICLE XIII.

Of Works before Justification.

Works done before the grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the School-authors say) deserve grace of congruity: yea rather, for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin.

De operibus ante justificationem.

Opera quae fiunt ante gratiam Christi, et spiritus ejus afflatum, cum ex fide Jesu Christi non prodeant, minime Deo grata sunt, neque gratiam (ut multi vocant) de congruo merentur. Immo cum non sunt facta ut Deus illa fieri voluit et praecepit, peccati rationem habere non dubitamus.

Notes on the Text of Article XIII.

The Latin word here used for inspiration is '*afflatus*.' Where the English says 'School-authors,' the Latin, less precisely, has '*multi*.' The technical phrase '*de congruo*' answers to the English 'of congruity.' 'The nature of sin' is in this Article as in the ninth, '*peccati rationem*.'

The Schoomen asserted two modes of meriting reward, '*de congruo*,' and '*de condigno*.' Man may merit at the hands of God in the former mode before grace has been received, in the latter mode after the reception of grace. Dr. Hey [*Lectures on the Articles*, xiii. 14.] gives this illustration to explain the distinction: 'A servant deserves his wages '*ex condigno*'; he may deserve support in sickness or old age, '*ex congruo*'. Sometimes instead of '*ex congruo*' the phrase '*ex proportione*' is used.'

Beveridge [Art. xiii. note.] quotes from De Soto: 'A work is *congruous*, to which a reward is not due from justice, but from a certain fitness'; and from Romaeus: 'That is said to be merit "*de condigno*", to which a reward must be rendered according to the requirement of justice, so that between the merit and the reward equality of quantity holds according to the principles of mutual justice. But one is said to deserve "*de congruo*" when between the merit and the reward there is a parity not of quantity but of proportion.' In plain English the merit of condignity is such that there is an absolute failure of justice if it receive not recompense. This agrees with the doctrine of the Council of Trent noticed in Article

XII on works after justification and will explain our allusion there to the scholastic doctrine of merit. And though the principle of *congruity* claims less at the hands of strict justice, yet it amounts to an equal certainty inasmuch as the Most High must be conceived as always and without fail doing that which is congruous and proportional to His perfection and the nature of things to do.

Thus if man can ensure the bestowal of grace on the principle of *congruity* when still in his natural condition; and can claim it, after grace received, on the principle of *condignity*, or strict right and justice, we are brought round by a circuitous path, and in spite of many words about grace to much the same result as that which follows from the doctrines of Pelagius, namely that man by working in a particular manner ensures his own salvation.

This is one of the original Articles of 1552. No source is suggested for its expressions.

Observations on Article XIII.

The Fathers were naturally let to discuss the nature of heathen virtues, but this question was scarcely within the view of the writers of the Article although, no doubt, it comes within its terms. What has been already said of the doctrine of congruity will explain what the Reformers really had in view in this Article.

The Council of Trent avoided in terms *condignity* and *congruity* to which some of its divines were much opposed; but its decisions seem to adopt both principles. The following canon bears most directly on the subject before us: ‘Whoever shall say that all the works which are done before justification, on whatsoever account they may be done, are truly sins and deserve the hatred of God, or that the more vehemently a man tries to dispose himself for grace, the more grievously he sins, let him be anathema.’ [Session VI. Canon 7.] To which Calvin replied, after quoting other passages: ‘Let them anathematize the Apostle who declares that without faith it is impossible to please God (Heb. 11:6). Let them anathematize Christ and Paul who declare that all unbelievers are dead and are raised from death by the Gospel (John 5:24, Eph. 2:1).

It is obvious that in this and other Decrees and Canons the Council of Trent chose to state the condemned doctrine in the most offensive terms, and in words which (however susceptible of right interpretation) would not be deliberately adopted in the formal utterance of accredited divines. The doctrine of the present Article presents considerable difficulties to every mind which is not fully enlightened as to the true nature and abode of sin. There are few subjects, consequently, with respect to which a delicate discrimination and careful handling are more necessary. While the truth should be firmly held, broad assertions readily misunderstood should be sedulously avoided. The following quotation from Bishop Beveridge on this Article is clear in its distinctions and carefully discriminative in its language: ‘Though we have power to do such things as in themselves are pleasing to God, yet we have not power so to do those things that our doing them should be pleasing to Him. The matter of the actions we do may be accepted, but our manner of doing them is still rejected. Because though we do the thing that God commands of ourselves, yet we can never do it in the way that God commands.’

The truth is that the world, for the most part, never looks beyond the outer act. Some actions are sinful, some are virtuous. It can say little more. But the theologian cannot stop there. He knows that the real goodness of an action lies in the relation of the act to the mind which inspired it. One man from love, another from ostentation, another from covetous ambition, may perform some splendid act of public benefit. Outwardly, the transaction is identical in all these cases. The moral value of the act to the individual himself varies in each case from high virtue to absolute turpitude.

It is just this principle which is applied according to the rules of Scripture morality in the Article before us. That spiritual condition which can alone deliver a human being from the state of sin and condemnation being absent, whether we view it on the side of justification or sanctification, there must be the taint of sin unremoved in all the actions. We do not herein confuse virtue with vice. We do not lose sight of the truth that there are many degrees in sin and in consequent responsibility (Luke 12:47–48). But as in the Ninth Article we confessed that the *concupiscentia* remaining in the regenerate had,

according to the Scripture standard, ‘the nature of sin’; so now we are sadly obliged to own that the best actions of the unregenerated have ‘the nature of sin’ likewise. Not that the action itself loses its right description as a virtue, but that in its origin and outcoming from the heart, in its relation to the spiritual nature of the doer of it, it could not fail to partake of the sinfulness which was in him.

The scriptural treatment and proof of this Article may be most soundly constructed upon the above line of argument.

ARTICLE XIV.

Of Works of Supererogation.

Voluntary Works besides, over and above God’s commandments, which they call Works of Supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety. For by them men do declare, that they do not only render unto God as much as they are bound to do, but that they do more for his sake, than of bounden duty is required; whereas Christ saith plainly, When ye have done all that are commanded to you, say, We be unprofitable servants.

De operibus supererogationis.

Opera quae supererogationis appellant, non possunt sine arrogantia et impietate praedicari. Nam illis declarant homines, non tantum se Deo reddere, quae tenentur, sed plus in ejus gratiam facere, quam deberent, cum aperte Christus dicat; Cum feceritis omnia quaecunque praecepta sunt vobis, dicite, Servi inutiles sumus.

Notes on the Text of Article XIV.

The derivation and use of the word *supererogation* may be thus traced: *Rogare* was the technical word used for proposing a law to the Roman people assembled in Comitia (Anglicè *to bring in a bill*). *Erogare* was similarly applied if the decree was one for paying money out of the treasury. Hence *Supererogare* easily came to mean to pay over and above the amount granted.

The word is used in the Vulgate and also in the Rhemish version in Luke 10:35, “quodcunque supererogaveris” – whatever thou shalt supererogate, Greek ‘προσδαπάνησις’. The comment of the Rhemish Testament is this: ‘It is manifest there are such works.’ It ought rather to be said ‘It is manifest there is such a word.’ Its meaning is another question. The history of the text of the Article presents no point of interest. It was retained from the Articles of 1552 with the slight change of the word ‘impiety’ instead of ‘iniquity’.

Observations on Article XIV.

The rise of the doctrine of supererogation is assigned by Mosheim to the thirteenth century. By this may no doubt be understood, not that there are no traces of the name and idea before that time, but that it then assumed form and consistency. Gieseler [*Eccl Hist.* 3rd Period, Div. III. c. 6, § 84.] thus writes: ‘The Aristotelian divines of the 13th century readily entered on the task of vindicating dogmatically this most monstrous of all papal pretensions. Alexander of Hales and Albertus Magnus invented the doctrine of the *Thesaurus supererogationis perfectorum*, out of which, by virtue of the power of the keys, not only the temporal penalties of the living for sin, but agreeably to the extension of the power of the keys over the dead long ere now established, the penalties also of men suffering in purgatory were discharged. Thomas Aquinas completed this theory.’ Gieseler adds this extract in a note; it will illustrate the teaching which first fashioned into a system the Roman dogmas: ‘Indulgences hold good both ecclesiastically and in respect of the judgment of God, for the remission of the residuum of punishment after contrition and absolution and confession. The reason why they hold good is the unity

of the mystical body in which many have supererogated in works of penitence beyond the measure of the debts, and have patiently endured many unjust tribulations, by which a multitude of punishments could have been discharged, had they been owing. Of whose merits great is the abundance, that they exceed the punishment now due to the living, and especially by reason of the merit of Christ.... But it has been said above that one man can satisfy for another. But the saints, in whom a superabundance of works of satisfaction is found, wrought not works of this kind definitely for him who needs remission (otherwise he would obtain remission without an indulgence), but in common for the whole Church ... and so the aforesaid merits are the common property of the whole Church. But that which is the common property of a number is distributed to individuals of that number at the will of him who presides over it.' [Thomas Aquinas, *Comm. in Sent.* lib. iv.]

Such was the teaching which formed the Tridentine divines. The student will understand with what a revulsion of disgust the Reformers shrank back from the scholastic theologians; and will comprehend the feeling which prompted the epithets which they often applied to them.

The Council of Trent handled this subject very briefly. The subject of Indulgences was treated in the final session which was exceedingly hurried. We have therefore only this general decree on indulgences (Session XXV): 'Since the power of conferring indulgences has been granted by Christ to the Church, and since the Church from the earliest times has used a power of this kind, divinely given, this holy Council teaches and enjoins, &c.' (The remainder of the decree forbids the abuses of the improper vending of indulgences.) We have not, therefore, a decree of the Council of Trent directly on the subject of supererogation.

But Leo X wrote thus: "The Roman Pontiff may for reasonable causes, by his apostolical authority grant indulgences out of the superabundant merits of Christ and the saints to the faithful who are united to Christ by charity as well for the living as the dead.'

Bellarmino [Willett, vol. ix. pp. 243–245.] defines this matter more precisely. There is an infinite treasure of the satisfaction purchased by the passion of Christ extant in the Church.... The price of Christ's blood hath not been applied to all, the most part of men being subject to condemnation; there remaineth then a great deal of the price of Christ's death to be applied' – and the bull of Clement VI says 'to the heap of which treasure the merits of the blessed mother of God and of all the saints add support.'

To one knowing the New Testament it is sufficient refutation to state the doctrine thus fully and broadly. But we add the following observations:

1. If Christ's merits are infinite, how can finite additions increase them? Infinity plus worlds is still only infinity.

2. The root of the error lies in the fundamental heresies noted under the previous Articles, relating to the nature of original sin; salvation by grace; the state of the justified; the works of the justified, &c.

3. The full antidote is to be found in the relation of the Christian to God. Reconciled in Christ he is a son, not a servant. His good works are the outflowing of filial affection, not works of a servant wrought for wages. So far as they are otherwise they are not *in him* good works at all.

4. The Twelfth Article has taught us that the good works of the justified cannot endure the severity of God's judgment. They can still less supply the deficiencies of other men, even if God had anywhere promised to accept such a substitution.

5. They who scoff at the imputation of Christ's righteousness as an unreal mockery of goodness have accepted the most unreal mockery of all, namely the merits of one sinner applied to the redemption of another sinner, neither being in the least cognizant of the transaction (see Aquinas above).

ARTICLE XV.

Of Christ alone without Sin.

Christ in the truth of our nature was made like unto us in all things (sin only except), from which he was clearly void, both in his flesh and in his spirit. He came to be the Lamb without spot, who, by the sacrifice of himself once made, should take away the sins of the world, and sin (as St. *John* saith), was not in him. But all we the rest (although baptized, and born again in Christ), yet offend in many things; and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

De Christo, qui solus est sine peccato.

Christus in nostrae naturae veritate, per omnia similis factus est nobis, excepto peccato, a quo prorsus erat immunis, tum in carne, tum in spiritu. Venit ut agnus, absque macula, qui mundi peccata per immolationem sui semel factam tolleret, et peccatum (ut inquit *Johannes*) in eo non erat: sed no reliqui etiam baptizati, et in Christo regenerati, in multis tamen offendimus omnes. Et si dixerimus, quia peccatum non habemus, nos ipsos seducimus, et veritas in nobis non est.

Notes on the Text of Article XV.

The Latin title is slightly more definite than the English, '*qui solus est sine peccato.*' 'Clearly void' is the Latin '*prorsus immunis.*' 'Clearly' must therefore be understood not in the sense of *manifestly*, but *so as to be clear*, 'entirely void.'

There are only one or two very slight verbal differences between this Article and the fourteenth of 1552. The history of the text presents no feature of special interest.

The Chief Divisions of Article XV.

1. That Christ was '*very man*' has been already demonstrated under Article II. This is reasserted with the addition of the absolute sinlessness of our Lord both in flesh and spirit.
2. This sinlessness made Him the perfect and sufficient sacrifice.
3. No other human being is free from sin.

The proofs from Scripture may be directed to establish these several propositions.

Observations on Article XV.

We have noticed already (See above, Observations on Article VII.) the presumption of some of the Anabaptists who asserted that they had attained a sinless condition. This will further come under notice in the next Article. Neither need we comment further on the Pelagian notion of the possibility of a man leading a perfectly holy life. The history of the Article will mainly center in the dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. In Field's learned *Book of the Church*, [Append. III. 6.] there will be found a full exposition of the novelty of this opinion. It was first definitely discussed by the schoolmen. About A.D. 1300 Duns Scotus made it part of his system, and thenceforward the Scotists and Franciscans upheld it. On the other hand, the Thomists and Dominicans, following Thomas Aquinas, opposed it.

Early in the sixteenth century the imposture practiced by some Dominicans at Berne on the young monk Jetzer made this contest notorious. [See D'Aubigné, *Hist. of Ref.* viii. 2.] In the age of the Reformation the Roman Church was about equally divided on the subject. Cardinal Cajetan, well known in the history of Luther, presented a treatise to Leo X controverting the doctrine as novel and untrue. From this treatise Field (*ut supra*) gives the following extract:

‘St. Augustine, writing upon the thirty-fourth Psalm, saith that “Adam died for sin; that Mary who came out of the loins of Adam died for sin; but that the flesh of the Lord, which He took of the Virgin Mary, died to take away sin.” And in his second book, *De Baptismo Parvulorum*, “He only, who ceasing not to be God became man, never had sin, neither did He take the flesh of sin, or sinful flesh, though He took the flesh of His mother that was sinful.” And in his tenth book, “De Genesi ad literam,” he saith: “Though the body of Christ were taken of the flesh of a woman that was conceived out of the propagation of sinful flesh, yet because He was not so conceived of her as she was conceived, therefore it was not sinful flesh, but the similitude of sinful flesh.” And St. Ambrose, upon those words, *Blessed are the undefiled*, hath these words: “The Lord Jesus came; and that flesh that was subject to sin in His mother performed the warfare of virtue.” And St. Chrysostom, upon Matthew, saith: “though Christ was no sinner, yet He took the nature of man, of a woman that was a sinner.” And Eusebius Emisenus (about 350) in his second sermon upon the Nativity hath these words: “There is none free from the tie and bond of original sin, no, not the mother of the Redeemer.” St. Remigius (about 850) saith: “The blessed Virgin Mary was made clean from all stain of sin, that the man Christ Jesus might be conceived of her without sin.” St. Maximus, St. Bede, St. Bernard, and other Romish saints, are in the like manner quoted.

Scotus himself propounded the doctrine of the immaculate conception cautiously, while Thomas Aquinas, following Lombard and the earlier doctors of the Church, absolutely denied it.

At the Council of Trent the two conflicting doctrines on the immaculate conception came into open collision.

The matter was referred to the Pope who suggested a middle course. There was therefore the following rider attached to the first decree of the fifth Session: –

‘This Holy Council, however, declares that it is not their intention to comprehend in this decree, where it treats of original sin, the blessed and immaculate Virgin Mary, the mother of God, but that the constitutions of Pope Sixtus IV, of happy memory, are to be observed under the penalties contained in these constitutions which the Council renews.’

These constitutions also were neutral. In 1476 Sixtus IV forbade the Franciscans to be accused of heresy on this point. But though he favored the Franciscans, he did not pronounce any decision on the doctrine.

Since the era of the Reformation, mainly perhaps through the dominant influence of the Jesuits, the belief in the immaculate conception has more and more widely prevailed in the Roman Church. Finally (December 9, 1854), Pius IX issued his bull declaring the belief in that doctrine to be a matter of faith almost without opposition.

The notion of the sinlessness of the Virgin Mary will be found in an earlier form than that which has ultimately prevailed in the Roman Church. Many who held that she was conceived in sin thought that she was either sanctified *in* the womb or at least *from* her birth so as to be without sin. These ideas will be found in some of the quotations in the extract given above from Cajetan. Augustine thought it more reverential to abstain from discussing the question. Origen and Chrysostom, commenting on her history in the Gospels, distinctly attribute sin to her. For fuller details on this subject the student is referred to Field (*ut supra*).

ARTICLE XVI.

Of Sin after Baptism.

Not every deadly sin willingly committed after Baptism is sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable. Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after Baptism. After we have received the Holy Ghost, we may depart from grace given and fall into sin, and by the grace of God we may arise again and amend our lives. And therefore they are to be condemned which say, they can no more sin as long as they live here, or deny the place of forgiveness to such as truly repent.

De peccato post Baptismum.

Non omne peccatum mortale post Baptismum voluntarie perpetratum, est peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum, et irremissibile. Proinde lapsis a Baptismo in peccata, locus poenitentiae non est negandus. Post acceptum Spiritum Sanctum possumus a gratia data recedere atque peccare, denuoque per gratiam Dei resurgere ac resipiscere; ideoque illi damnandi sunt, qui se, quamdiu hic vivant, amplius non posse peccare affirmant, aut vere resipiscentibus veniae locum denegant.

Notes on the Text of Article XVI.

The Latin text presents no important matter for comment as compared with the English, unless perhaps the phrase '*locus poenitentiae*' for 'grant of repentance.'

The expression '*peccatum mortale*,' or 'deadly sin,' may require a few words inasmuch as our Church has been censured for using it both here and in the Litany as seeming to favour the Roman distinction of mortal and venial sin, whereas all sin is deadly or deserving of death.

But we observe that in fact our Church has avoided any such classification, and has nowhere assigned any marks or gradations by which sins might be distinguished into classes.

It is difficult to produce a clear and authoritative Roman definition of the distinction in question. The Council of Trent [Session XIV. c. 5.] decrees that all mortal sins must be confessed, but that 'venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God, may be concealed without fault and expiated by many other remedies.' For a more exact account we must refer to the casuistical writers of the Roman Church. And here we find that practically the casuists of the Jesuit school have for the most part prevailed in modern Romanism. This brings us to such definitions as those of Bellarmine: 'Mortal sins are those which cast men out of God's favour, and deserve eternal damnation; venial sins do somewhat displease God, yet deserve not eternal death, but are pardonable of their own nature.' Further, venial sins are described as being involuntary and sudden passions – or voluntary sins of a light amount such as stealing small coins, &c.

The essence of sin consists in its relation to the spiritual condition of the sinner. The very same act committed by two different individuals entails widely different measures of guilt. Any classification, therefore, such as those of Jesuit casuists, which only or chiefly takes account of the measure or even nature of the outward act, must be fundamentally unsound and untrue.

All sin is deserving of death nevertheless, some sins committed in some states of mind have a peculiar heinousness as being more directly against grace. Sins of presumption, sins against light, are manifestly most deeply injurious to the soul and may be so even when they injure our neighbour little or scarcely at all. Without defining these more exactly, our Church here distinguishes them by the epithet '*deadly*' from the ordinary sins of infirmity which were spoken of more particularly in the last Article.

The present wording of the Article is very slightly varied from the Fifteenth Article of 1552. Archdeacon Hardwick [*Hist. of Articles*, chap. v.] says that it is borrowed chiefly from the Augsburg

Confession. Bishop Browne also adopts this opinion. But a close comparison of this Article with the twelfth of the Confession of Augsburg will hardly bear this out. There is scarcely any verbal coincidence between the two.

The Chief Divisions of Article XVI.

1. Even heinous sin after baptism is not necessarily unpardonable.
2. The nature of the sin against the Holy Ghost.
3. The liability of the regenerate to fall from grace, and the possibility of their restoration.
4. The condemnation of two classes of opponents.

A scriptural exposition and proof of the Article may follow this arrangement.

The Roman Doctrine on Sin after Baptism.

The Fourteenth Session of the Council of Trent dealt with Penance and therefore with the present subject. The following extract from the second chapter of the decree of that session may suffice for the purpose of the present Article: 'If the baptized afterwards defile themselves by any transgression, it is not the will of Christ that they should be cleansed by a repetition of baptism, which is on no account lawful in the Catholic Church, but they should be placed as offenders before the tribunal of penance, that they may be absolved by the sentence of the priests, not once only, but as often as they penitently flee thereto, confessing their sins.'

Observations on Article XVI.

Early writers expressed themselves with various degrees of severity on the subject of sin after baptism. The practice of the Church in the second and third centuries exacted prolonged periods of penitence (the 'godly discipline' of our commination service) before flagrant transgressors, and more especially apostates, were restored to Communion. Yet the Church Catholic always held the duty of restoring penitents, and it was reserved for the sects of the Montanists in the second century, or the Novations in the third, and their successors to maintain the harsher practice in this matter.

The present Article would assure us that these rigid ideas were revived at the time of the Reformation. And we find that it was so. That this was one of the many forms of Anabaptist excess we learn from Calvin [*Institutes*, IV. i. 23.]: 'Our age also has some of the Anabaptists not very unlike the Novatians.... For they pretend that the people of God are regenerated in baptism into a pure and angelical life.... But if any man fail after baptism they leave nothing to him but the inexorable judgment of God.' Bishop Hooper [*Original Letters*, Parker Soc. p. 65.] speaks in similar terms: 'A man, they say, who is thus regenerate, cannot sin. They add that all hope of pardon is taken away from those who, after having received the Holy Ghost, fall into sin.' It is of some importance thus distinctly to identify the contemporary errors which were before the writers of this Article. In this point of view the quotation from Calvin is the more important, especially as a learned writer of the present day presses the supposed Lutheran origin of the Article to do dogmatic duty in his interpretation of it. In this Article neither Luther nor Calvin speaks individually. It is the earnest protest of the Church against the fanatical sectaries who narrowed the pale of salvation. It is the voice equally of Luther, of Calvin, of the Church of England; all in this matter at one.

Bishop Browne, in treating on this Article, discusses at length the doctrine of final perseverance of the elect, which he thinks it was intended to controvert. Other writers, however, though of different theological schools, do not seem to notice it under this Article, to which indeed it can scarcely belong. The most extreme Calvinists would admit that the truly regenerate may and do fall into sin – but (they would add) not finally.

They would not, therefore, recognise the doctrine of final perseverance as being even touched upon here. And it is certain that some of those who had much to do with framing the Articles held that doctrine. It is therefore omitted here as not coming within the scope of this Article.

The Sin against the Holy Ghost

The Article now under consideration was followed in the Articles of 1552 by another, there ranking as the sixteenth, which is here subjoined:—

‘Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.

‘Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is, when a man of malice and stubbornness of mind doth rail upon the truth of God’s word manifestly perceived, and being enemy thereunto, persecuteth the same. And because such be guilty of God’s curse, they entangle themselves with a most grievous and heinous crime, whereupon this kind of sin is called and affirmed of the Lord unpardonable.’

It was probably a wise exercise of discretion in Elizabeth’s divines to strike out this Article and to abstain from an attempt to define authoritatively the sin against the Holy Ghost. At the same time we may note that the Anabaptist extravagances occupy much less space in the thirty-nine than they did in the forty-two Articles. Those sects had declined in the intervening ten years, or it had become manifest that their adherents were of less consequence than had been supposed. And as the Article quoted above was doubtless intended to meet the case of consciences disturbed by the Anabaptist denial of ‘*a place of repentance*’ noted in the foregoing Article, the partial subsidence of the error allowed the Elizabethan divines to determine on its omission.

The doctrine of the Sin against the Holy Ghost has been the subject of many anxieties and much reasoning. Bishop Burnet at once dismisses its present possibility by limiting it to the original occasion recorded in the Gospels. Bishop Beveridge [Article XVI.] thus deals with it: ‘It shall therefore only never be pardoned by God because never repented of by us. For if it could be repented of by us, it could not but be pardoned by God, the promise of pardon to repentance running in general terms, that if a man do confess his sins to God, God will pardon his sins to him.’

This seems the only treatment of the subject in harmony with the whole of Scripture. When we have marshaled and considered the grand array of Gospel promises and asked ourselves what it is which excludes from a share in them, the answer cannot well be any other than this. It must be a spiritual state incompatible with the conditions of those promises. In other words, it must be a finally impenitent state since the promises to repentance are so full and free. And since the Holy Ghost is the source of all true spiritual life and feeling, we may well understand why such a desperate condition is described as the result of the sin against the Holy Ghost.

ARTICLE XVII.

Of Predestination and Election.

Predestination to Life is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby (before the foundations of the world were laid) he hath constantly decreed by his counsel secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God be called according to God's purpose by his Spirit working in due season: they through Grace obey the calling: they be justified freely: they be made sons of God by adoption: they be made like the image of his only begotten Son Jesus Christ: they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity.

As the godly consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their mind to high and heavenly things, as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal salvation to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God: so, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually before their eyes the sentence of God's Predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchlessness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.

Furthermore, we must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture: and, in our doings, that Will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God.

De praedestinatione et electione.

Prædestinatio ad vitam, est æternum Dei propositum, quo ante jacta mundi fundamenta, suo consilio, nobis quidem occulto, constanter decrevit, eos quos in Christo elegit ex hominum genere, a maledicto et exitio liberare, atque (ut vasa in honorem efficta) per Christum, ad æternam salutem adducere. Unde qui tam præclaro Dei beneficio sunt donati, illi spiritu ejus, opportuno tempore operante, secundum propositum ejus vocantur, vocationi per gratiam parent, justificantur gratis, adoptantur in filios Dei, unigeniti ejus Jesu Christi imagini efficiuntur conformes, in bonis operibus sancte ambulant, et demum ex Dei misericordia pertingunt ad sempiternam felicitatem.

Quemadmodum prædestinationis et electionis nostræ in Christo pia consideratio, dulcis, suavis, et ineffabilis consolationis plena est vere piis, et his qui sentiunt in se vim spiritus Christi, facta carnis, et membra, quæ adhuc sunt super terram, mortificantem, animumque ad coelestia et superna rapientem; tum quia fidem nostram de æterna salute consequenda per Christum plurimum stabilit atque confirmat, tum quia amorem nostrum in Deum vehementer accendit: ita hominibus curiosis, carnalibus, et spiritu Christi destitutis, ob oculos perpetuo versari prædestinationis Dei sententiam, perniciosissimum est præcipitium, unde illos diabolus protrudit, vel in desperationem, vel in æque perniciosam impurissimæ vitæ securitatem; deinde promissiones divinas sic amplecti oportet, ut nobis in sacris literis generaliter propositæ sunt, et Dei voluntas in nostris actionibus ea sequenda est, quam in verbo Dei habemus, diserte revelatam.

Notes on the Text of Article XVII.

1. The Latin and English versions of this Article correspond very closely.

2. ‘Wretchlessness’ signifies *carelessness*, the Latin equivalent being *securitas*. It is an antiquated form of the word *recklessness*, the older spelling of which was *reche* or *recche*. It is found in Hooker’s second Sermon on Jude 17–21, § 33: ‘It is want of faith in ourselves which makes us wretchless in building others.’

3. ‘We must receive God’s promises in such wise as they be generally set forth to us in Holy Scripture’; Latin, ‘*ut nobis in sacris literis generaliter propositae sunt*’. The word *generaliter* here requires special notice. It can hardly be necessary to observe that in a document of this character, written by men versed in technical phraseology, the popular or more modern usage of a word cannot be thought of; although probably in this case it would not lead us very wide of the mark. *Generalis* signifies that which relates to the *whole genus*. Hence in respect to the genus under consideration it is equivalent to *universal*; and is opposed to *singulus*, *specialis*. There are two modes of viewing the corresponding adverb *generaliter* in the clause under consideration. First we may take it in relation to the whole *genus* of promises. In this case we are admonished to take the whole of God’s promises together without selecting special ones here or there. It is the manner of Scripture to give a promise without condition in one place and with a condition in another (e.g. compare John 14:13 with 1 John 5:14). The Christian knows well how this manner conduces to a profitable searching of Holy Scripture and to a more accurate and balanced knowledge of the will of God.

Secondly, we may take the word *generaliter* in relation to the whole genus of those to whom the promises were given. There is some contemporary authority for so understanding it. The *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum* was prepared under the close superintendence of Archbishop Cranmer contemporaneously with the Articles. If Edward VI had lived a year longer, it would probably have become law. The language of the Articles is reproduced either literally or with some slight paraphrase in many of the corresponding portions. The twenty-second chapter, ‘*de predestinatione*’ of the section ‘*de haeresibus*’ is an expanded statement of the warning in the present Article against the peril of the doctrine of reprobation, and of the advantage of a pious reception of the doctrine of election. It frequently uses the very words of the Article, and it concludes with this admonition, ‘Wherefore all should be admonished that in their actions they should have no reference to decrees of predestination, but should adapt the whole course of their life to the laws of God; since they see that promises to the good, and threatenings to the bad, are in Holy Scripture generally set forth (*generaliter propositas*). For in respect of the worship of God we ought to enter those ways and dwell in that will of God which we see manifested to us in Holy Scripture.’ In this strictly parallel and contemporaneous passage, proceeding from the same authority, the word *generaliter* manifestly refers to the whole *genera* severally of the good and the bad.

Again in the controversies which led to the ill-omened attempt to lay the yoke of ultra-Calvinism on the Church of England in the days of Archbishop Whitgift, this expression of the Article was used in controversy. Dr. Baro, the Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity in Cambridge, dissented in some points from the extreme Calvinism then in vogue. The University authorities involved him in vexatious proceedings which ultimately led to his resignation.

Strype [*Whitgift*, iv. 17, 18.] gives an account of these troubles. In a discourse *ad clerum* (1595) Dr. Baro had maintained that ‘the promises of God made to us, as they are generally propounded to us, were to be generally understood: as it is set down in the Seventeenth Article.’

The meaning of this is sufficiently plain from the doctrine of his opponents immediately subjoined – viz. that God did on purpose create the greatest part of men to destruction; that Christ did not die for all; and ‘for the same cause they would not have the promises to be general, but extended them to those few persons alone who were created by God to be saved.’ It appears, therefore, that the second is the more correct interpretation of this part of the Article, although the first is unquestionably true. And it seems also correct to identify this with the expression of Melancthon, ‘and if other points about election are susceptible of subtle disputation, yet it is profitable to the godly to hold that *the promise is universal*.’ But having admitted this, it will not do straightway to qualify it or recall it by limiting it to

the baptized, of any other *class* in the human race in order to deduce a theory of election. We must hold that the promises apply to the *genus*, and not to any *species* of the *genus* Man.

Finally, Bishop Beveridge well observes on this part of the Article:— ‘It is here very opportunely added, that we must receive God’s promises as they be generally set forth in the Holy Scripture. Though they are but some that God hath elected, yet His promises are made to all: Come unto me all ye that are weary and heavy laden, and I will give you rest (Matt. 11:28): and Whosoever believeth in Him shall not perish, but have everlasting life (John 3:16). In the application of which and the like promises, we must not have respect to the eternity of God’s purpose, but to the universality of His promise. His promises are made to all, and therefore are all bound to lay hold upon His promises; and as we are to receive His promises, so are we also to obey His precepts as made to all. So that in all our doings the will of God is to be followed as we have it expressly declared to us in His word: not considering whether God elected me from eternity, but whether I obey Him in time: if I obey Him in time, I may certainly conclude that He elected me from eternity.’

In short, that God’s promises are ‘generally set forth’ is the very nerve and sinew of gospel preaching; as it is also the delight and confidence of the pious soul to think that God hath chosen it, rather than that it chose God.

4. There are only one or two unimportant verbal differences between the present Article and the corresponding form of 1552. It does not appear that the language of this Article was borrowed from any special theological source.

The Principal Divisions of Article XVII.

There are three principal divisions of this Article corresponding to the three paragraphs which it contains.

I. The definition of predestination to life, its origin in the secret purpose of God, its manifestation, working, and final issue in the elect. To a great extent this paragraph is a compendium of Rom. 8.

II. The blessedness of this doctrine to those who by God’s grace have grasped His promises. The extreme peril of the opposite doctrine of reprobation to the unconverted.

III. A caution against partial dealing with God’s word, whether by selecting special passages to build up a compact system; or by limiting the wide scope and comprehensiveness of God’s offer of mercy through Christ.

Observations on Article XVII.

The purport of our observations upon this Article will be not so much to advocate any particular system as to introduce the student to the subject generally, and to give him a fair acquaintance with the chief phases of those controversies about it which are now happily dormant.

Before we enter upon the history of the doctrine of this Article, it is exceedingly important to note that difficulties about predestination are not peculiar to Christianity; do not, in point of fact, arise out of it, and are not escaped by disbelieving the Scripture. The Fate of the Greek mythology was superior to Zeus himself. The Stoics among Greek philosophers were rigid fatalists. Some account of the disputes of Greek philosophers on this subject may be found in Cicero, *De Fato*.

According to Josephus [*Antiquities*, XVIII. i. 3.] the Pharisees held that ‘all things were done by Fate,’ yet with a reservation of the freedom of the will. It is well known that Mahomedans are strict fatalists. An interesting account of the Mahomedan idea of the unity of God will be found in Palgrave’s ‘Journey through Central Arabia,’ ch. 8. According to this statement God is one, not only numerically and without plurality of nature or person, but as the only Agent, the only Force, through the universe, leaving nothing to any other beings but unconditional passiveness. The sole power, motor, energy, is God. Neither loving nor enjoying, He is thought of as an absolute, lonely Despot, dispensing felicity of damnation according to his will, and alike unsympathizing with either fate.

A subject like this, touching theology with one hand and philosophy with the other, as well as deeply rooted in Holy Scripture, was of necessity handled by the Early Fathers of the Church. Quotations from their writings may be seen in Bishop Browne, or other of the longer treatises on the Articles. It was reserved for Augustine in the fifth century to discuss systematically the doctrine of predestination. The following passage from his treatise *De Praedest. Sanctorum*, ch. 18, may illustrate his views: – ‘God hath chosen us in Christ before the foundation of the world, predestinating us to the adoption of sons: not because we were going to be *holy and spotless* of ourselves, but He elected us in order that we might be such. He did this according to the pleasure of His will in order that no man might boast of his own will, but of the will of God towards him.’

Augustine did not understand by *reprobation* a decree or purpose of damnation, but a leaving of the ungodly to the just consequences of their sins.

Since the time of Augustine, all sections of the Church have been more or less divided on this subject. The schoolmen discussed the subject of predestination with their usual minuteness. Aquinas and his followers adhered to Augustinian views. Scotus, in this as in other doctrines of grace and merit, approached nearer to Pelagianism.

We come next to the age of the Reformation. The most has been made of supposed differences between Luther and Melancthon on the one hand, and Calvin on the other, in respect of this doctrine. But the Reformers of all countries were strong Augustinians and, with some modifications, held the same general cast of doctrine on election. Dr. Macbride on this Article quotes Melancthon as saying that ‘though he speaks less harshly and less like a Stoic, he knows that Luther substantially agrees with him. To Calvin he says, I am satisfied our views agree, only mine are stated in a less refined manner.’ This may qualify assertions often made on a supposed serious difference between Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin on this point. Still it remains that Melancthon avoided the subject for popular treatment, gave it no place in the Confession of Augsburg, and would have shrunk from the harsh unqualified statements of Calvin; while the latter gave great prominence to it in every part of his teaching. In his *Institutes* he laid down absolute definitions on all the points of election, and these became to a large portion of the Protestants tests of orthodoxy. Since his days the name of Calvinism has been generally given to opinions on election agreeing with, or even approximating to, those which he held. It is even probable that, if the tenets of Arminius on this doctrine were preached plainly from a London pulpit, the preacher would be called a Calvinist by the ordinary hearer; to such a degree has Calvinism become popularly synonymous with a belief in election. A few extracts from Calvin’s *Institutes* will illustrate his doctrine on matters lying within this Article [Calvin, *Instit.* Lib. III. xxi. 5]: – ‘By prescience we mean that all things always were and ever continue under God’s eye. ... By Predestination we mean the eternal decree of God, by which He determined with Himself whatever he willed to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation.’

‘We say, then, that Scripture clearly proves this much, that God by His eternal and immutable counsel determined once for all those whom it was His will one day to admit to salvation, and those whom on the other hand it was His will to doom to destruction.’ [Ibid. xxi. 7.]

‘The first man fell because the Lord deemed it meet that He should; why He deemed it meet, we know not. It is certain, however, that it was just, because He saw that His own glory would thereby be displayed. When you hear the glory of God mentioned, understand that His justice is included. For that which deserves praise must be just. Man, therefore, falls, divine providence so ordaining, but he falls by his own fault.’ [Ibid. xxiii. 8.]

These extracts sufficiently set forth the nature of Calvinism proper on the subject before us. It is not too much to say that the leading theologians of Switzerland, Western Germany, Holland, Scotland, and England, [See Dean Goode on *Infant Baptism*, chap. 3.] during the reign of Elizabeth, held views closely akin to those of Calvin. In the inevitable flux and reflux of human opinion a reaction set in, the leading spirit in which was Arminius. He was educated at Geneva, and became professor of divinity at the

University of Leyden. He died A.D. 1609. After his death the celebrated Grotius, Episcopius, and others maintained his opinions. So far as our present Article is concerned, it is only necessary to quote the first of the five Articles which the Arminians at first maintained against the current theology in Holland [Mosheim, *Cent. XVII.* sect. ii. part ii. 3.]: —

‘God, from all eternity, determined to bestow salvation on those who, He foresaw, would persevere unto the end in their faith in Jesus Christ: and to inflict everlasting punishments on those who should continue in their unbelief, and resist unto the end His divine succours.’ We must refer for the history of the Arminians, as a sect, to Mosheim as above.

We are now in a position to define the terms usually employed by English divines in writing on the doctrine of this Article.

1. Calvinism holds the absolute election to eternal life of a certain limited number of individuals; and that this election is entirely irrespective of anything which God foresaw in them, and proceeds from the exercise of His will alone. Calvin himself taught also the predestination to damnation of the residue of mankind. But the greater part of those commonly called Calvinists do not hold the doctrine of *reprobation*. The usually approach nearer to the doctrine of St. Augustine, and are content to say that God simply leaves the impenitent to the inevitable consequences of their sins — a doctrine known technically as *praeterition*.

There are, however, two distinct sections among Calvinists known as *Supralapsarian* and *Sub* or *Infralapsarian*, from the opinion they hold about the fall of man in connection with the decrees of God. The *Supralapsarian* holds that God from all eternity decreed the fall of Adam and the salvation or damnation of all men.

The *Sublapsarian* deems election to have taken place subsequently to, or at least on the supposition of, the fall of Adam who sinned freely and not by the decree of God. He holds that all who have been elected in pursuance of this merciful interference of God will have the grace of final perseverance. With regard to the rest of mankind he usually holds the doctrine of *praeterition*. It is obvious from the extracts given above that Calvin himself was a *Supralapsarian*. In our own country and Church few of those ordinarily called Calvinists follow him in the peculiarities of *supralapsarianism*.

2. Arminianism holds election to be contingent upon the foreknowledge of God as to the use which individuals will make of grace given. It does not hold the doctrine of final perseverance.

It is needful to caution the student as to the use of the terms *Calvinist* and *Arminian* as popularly used in this country. The names are frequently given to those who have very little in common with either Calvin or Arminius, as those who are acquainted with the works of either of those great divines well know. To a great extent these two names are used simply to express the two antagonistic opinions as to the ground upon which the Almighty proceeds in His mysterious operation of *election*. The Calvinist holds that God elects (so to speak) *arbitrarily*, and that the subsequent salvation and sanctification of the elect are a consequence simply of their election and necessarily follow from it.

The Arminian holds that God in His infinite foreknowledge, seeing the use which different persons will make of His grace given, determines and predestinates their eternal position accordingly.

Such is the established use of these words in England. It is obvious that there have been in this sense *Calvinists* and *Arminians* long before Calvin was born. They have existed in every section of the Christian Church, even in that Roman Church which would shrink from the names of Calvin and Arminius with horror. It may illustrate the subject to add that in the general Methodist movement of the last century Wesley took the Arminian and Whitfield the Calvinistic hypothesis. Their respective followers are still divided on this point, and the Wesleyans are reputed Arminians.

There have been some other opinions on the subject of election which either evade its difficulties or else attempt to modify or combine the two antagonistic doctrines.

Among the former of these may be named the opinion of those who hold election or predestination to life as simply implying that God calls certain nations to the knowledge of His saving truth, or certain persons to be members of His Church in which salvation is to be found. In other words, that He elects

masses of men to privileges, but not individuals to salvation. It must be obvious at a glance that this evades, without solving, the difficulty. For there is just as much that is *arbitrary* (to our ideas) in placing some persons in a position where they may be saved and omitting others as there is in other views of election.

Among modifications or combinations of the two great antagonistic doctrines on election, that of Baxter may be mentioned as illustrated by the following quotation from his *God's Goodness Vindicated* (ii. 13). 'All have so much grace as bringeth and leaveth the success to man's will' (i.e. allows the possibility of salvation to all), and moreover there is 'a special decree and grace of God, which with a chosen number shall antecedently infallibly insure His ends in their repentance, faith, perseverance, and salvation. Is this any detraction from His universal grace, or rather a higher demonstration of His goodness? As it is no wrong to man that God maketh angels more holy, immutable, and happy.'

The history of this doctrine in our own Church may be briefly sketched thus: – Until the time of Laud the Calvinistic doctrine prevailed. In connection with this the student may refer to the Lambeth Articles and the Synod of Dort. In the time of Laud, and mainly through his influence, a predominance of Arminian doctrine was established. The reaction from the Puritanism of the Commonwealth, which was strongly Calvinistic, further strengthened Arminianism, which thenceforward obtained a firm hold of the Church of England.

The opinion of an independent thinker like Coleridge may be interesting to some readers; we therefore add the following from his *Aids to Reflection* [Aphorism II. 'On that which is indeed spiritual religion.']: – 'No impartial person, competently acquainted with the history of the Reformation, and the works of the earlier Protestant divines at home and abroad, even to the close of Elizabeth's reign, will deny that the doctrines of Calvin on redemption, and the natural state of fallen man, are in all essential points the same as those of Luther, Zuinglius, and the first Reformers collectively. These doctrines have, however, since the re-establishment of the Episcopal Church at the return of Charles II, been as generally exchanged for what is commonly styled Arminianism, but which, taken as a complete and explicit scheme of belief, it would be both historically and theologically more accurate to call Grotianism, or the Gospel according to Grotius. The change was not, we may readily believe, effected without a struggle.'

In the religious revival of the last century many of the most devoted leaders held strong Calvinistic opinions. The consequence was a renewal of controversy often carried on with great bitterness. But the example of Simeon and other leaders of the rising Evangelical body in the Church led to the abandonment of the controversy on the more speculative points of the Calvinistic doctrine. It may be useful to the student to be enabled to form some opinion on the existing state of thought on this subject in the Church of England. If it be possible to give a probable account of the present position of the bulk of that which is commonly called the Evangelical section of the Church in respect of this doctrine, there can scarcely be found a more typical name in the general estimation than that of Simeon. It may be well, therefore, to give some extracts illustrating his views. In the preface to his *Horae Homileticae* he explains at some length his position as being in some respects midway between Calvinism and Arminianism. But this is more tersely expressed in the *Recollections of Simeon*, by the Rev. A. W. Brown, chap. 13: – 'Calvinists affirm the doctrine of free election apart from any excellence in man, of utter helplessness in our nature, of salvation entirely by faith, and that not of ourselves. This is all right and scriptural. On the other hand, the Arminians affirm that we shall be saved according as we do good or evil, that man is a free agent, that he is wholly responsible for his actions, that he must work out his own salvation. This also is all right and scriptural. But as soon as either party makes use of its own half of these doctrines to disprove those of its opponents, it is wrong. What though these doctrines are irreconcilable by us; does God require us to reconcile them? ... Election of the redeemed is made by God's sovereignty, quite irrespective of any good in them: if there turn out good in them, it is the consequence, not the cause, of their election. For the nature of man is wholly corrupt, and any

good in it is put there by God. So far I agree with the Calvinists. But rejection or reprobation is not irrespective of evil in those who are rejected, because in that case God would *will the death of a sinner*, and would take pleasure in his death, and not that he should turn to God and live ... I will never agree with the Calvinists that both election and rejection are irrespective of man's character; nor with the Arminians that they are both dependent on it.

'Christ died for the sins of the whole world. The Bible says so in many passages. What have we to do to judge God's revelation by metaphysical deductions and supposed consequences? Men say, Then some of the blood of Christ proved inefficacious. Scripture does not say so; and yet Scripture says, "And so the weak perish for whom Christ died" (1 Cor. 8:11).

'Saints shall be preserved to the end, not because they cannot fall, for they may; but because God will uphold them. There is nothing in the saint that makes his salvation certain, yet God hath decreed that he shall not perish. He is preserved by God, but not by anything which God hath put into him.'

On comparing these statements with that which is properly called Calvinism, it will be found that they assert unconditional election by God's sovereign will, and the preservation of the elect to the end; but they reject the doctrine of reprobation, and they assert that Christ died for all men. This will bear out a previous statement that in point of fact the bulk of those in the Church of England who are usually styled Calvinists are more properly Augustinians, for in those points in which Calvin went beyond Augustine, they will be found generally agreeing with the latter. It is difficult, if not impossible, to give an equally probable account of the state of opinion on the doctrine of this Article in other sections of the English Church. It is, however, a probable supposition that the majority may be Arminian upon the whole since denunciations of Calvinism are so frequently heard.

In the midst of this disunion of opinion as to the deep things of God's will, a point of agreement may be found for men of humble piety. They will acknowledge that if they have found God, it was because God sought and found them. State the alternative: Did you choose God, or did God choose you? And who that knows his own heart will hesitate as to the answer? If they have the love of God in their hearts, and they are asked whether there was any distinguishing goodness in them for which they were chosen of God, they will unfeignedly deny it, and be the first to own that all was of God's free grace in bringing them to Him from first to last.

Turning next to the Church of Rome, we observe that the Tridentine divines were too much divided in their opinions to deal with the subject of election in general. They did, however, negative the doctrine of reprobation [Sess. vi. can. 17.]: – 'If any one shall say that the grace of justification belongs to none but those predestined to life, but that all the rest who are called, are called, but do not receive grace, as being predestined by the divine power to evil, let him be anathema.' Upon the whole, the section of the Roman Church which, since the Reformation, has upheld the doctrines of St. Augustine, has been the weaker. This may be seen in the history of the Jansenists in France in the latter part of the seventeenth century, and may also be inferred from the dominant influence of the Jesuits whose theology has been of a more Pelagian cast.

For convenience of reference the following documents are subjoined: –

A Translation of the Lambeth Articles, as approved by Archbishop Whitgift and other bishops.

[Strype's *Whitgift*.]

I. God from eternity has predestined some to life, and some He has reprobated to death.

II. The moving or efficient cause of predestination to life is not the foresight of faith, or of perseverance, or of good works, or of anything which is in the persons predestinated, but it is the sole will of God who is well pleased.

III. The number of the predestinated is predefined and certain, it can be neither increased nor diminished.

IV. Those who are not predestinated to salvation, of necessity will be damned on account of their sins.

V. True, living, and justifying faith, and the sanctifying Spirit of God, is not extinguished, falleth not away, vanisheth not away in the elect, either finally or totally.

VI. A man truly faithful, i.e. endued with justifying faith, is certain with the full assurance of faith, of the remission of his sins, and his eternal salvation through Christ.

VII. Saving grace is not given, is not communicated, is not granted to all men, by which they may be saved if they will.

VIII. No man can come unto Christ unless it shall have been given to him, and unless the Father shall have drawn him. And all men are not drawn by the Father, in order that they may come to the Son.

IX. It is not placed in the will or power of each man to be saved.

An abstract of the Five Points of Arminianism, condemned by the Synod of Dort.

[Mosheim, *Cent. XVII*, sec. ii. pt. ii. c. iii. 4.]

I. That God from all eternity decreed the salvation of all those whose faith in Christ He foresaw would endure to the end; and the everlasting punishment of those whose ultimate unbelief He foresaw.

II. The Jesus Christ made a full atonement for all; which, however, must be appropriated by faith.

III. That true faith cannot be the growth of our natural free will; that, therefore, regeneration and renewal, the operation of the Holy Ghost, are necessary.

IV. That this divine grace is the source of all which is good in man; but that it may be resisted by the sinful will, and be ineffectual.

V. That those who are endued with true faith have sufficient grace to give them final victory; but that the question whether they may, nevertheless, fall away finally has not yet been sufficiently cleared up from Holy Scripture.

This last question was afterwards answered by the Arminians in the affirmative. The Third Article was also taught in a manner that approached to Pelagian opinions.

ARTICLE XVIII.

Of obtaining eternal Salvation only by the Name of Christ.

They also are to be had accursed that presume to say that every man shall be saved by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life according to that Law, and the light of Nature. For holy Scripture doth set out unto us only the Name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved.

De speranda aeterna salute tantum in nomine Christi.

Sunt et illi anathematizandi, qui dicere audent unumquemque in lege aut secta quam profitetur esse servandum, modo juxta illam et lumen naturae accurate vixerit, cum sacrae literae tantum Jesu Christi nomen praedicent, in quo salvos fieri homines oporteat.

Notes on the Text of Article XVIII.

They also are to be had accursed: Latin, ‘Sunt illi anathematizandi.’ The mode of expression is derived from the ancient usage of synodical condemnation by the word *anathema*.

The copulative particle *also* involves some little grammatical difficulty. But it seems to connect this Article with the Sixteenth. The text remains scarcely varied from the Forty-two Articles.

The Article consists of a proposition which is condemned, to which is added a clause indicating the reason of that condemnation, and the Scripture ground on which it is based. Hence the mode of dealing with this Article by Scripture proof will be manifest.

Observations on Article XVIII.

This Article is not in debate between ourselves and any section of the Christian Church. Latitudinarians may call it in question; but no sect can deny it which believes in the efficacy of the death of Christ.

It is manifest that the Article had in view some unbelievers of the age of the Reformation. That this was so appears from the contemporary *Reformatio Legum* (ch. xi.): – ‘Horrible and vain is the audacity of those who contend that men may hope for salvation in every religion and sect which they may profess.’

The subject of the possibility of salvation for a heathen is generally noticed under this Article. Most of the commentators seem to agree that the Article does not absolutely pronounce upon that point. It asserts that none can be saved but by Christ. But it is silent on the question which was touched upon with some degree of hope by some of the early Fathers, how far it may be conceivable that some who have never heard of Christ may be saved *by Him*. The first two chapters of the Epistle to the Romans will naturally be referred to on this subject. The ‘Judge of all the earth’ has himself assured us that there will be discrimination at the last between the ignorant and the enlightened sinner. He tells us that eternal justice will not involve all in one *indiscriminate* ruin. ‘That servant *which knew his Lord’s will* and prepared not himself, neither did according to His will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But *he that knew not* and did commit things worthy of stripes shall be beaten with few stripes.’ Consistently with the absence of detail and circumstantiality which it has been the will of God should characterize all revelations of the course of His final justice, what more distinct utterance could we have? We may add, what further revelation are we entitled even to desire?